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Michael J. Whyte, Esq., ISB #4645
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES,
2635 Channing Way
Idaho Falls ID 83404
Telephone (208)522-1230
Fax (208)522-1277
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Attorney for Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
THE WATKINS COMPANY, LLC,
an Idaho limited liability company,
Plaintiff,
V.

MICHAEL STORMS and KA THY
BURGGRAF,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-08-7258

DEFENDANTS' TRIAL BRIEF

STATEMENT OF CASE
The parties entered into a long-term lease beginning July 31, 1996 for the purpose of
operating The Brownstone Restaurant. This is a 30 year lease with two additional 10-year options.
This lease and accompanying addenda A, B, C and D outline the terms of the lease and the parties'
respective responsibilities. Plaintiff filed the complaint in this matter in November 2008 claiming
various breaches of the lease including failure to timely pay the rent; failure to pay rent based on a
formula using The Brownstone Restaurant's sales proceeds; failure to pay for the use of an upstairs
space located above The Brownstone Restaurant; failure to pay for the use of space titled "Space 16";
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failure to pay for the use of an outdoor dining area; failure to pay for storage of a cooler stored at a
place plaintiff commonly referred to as "the pipe yard." In general, defendant denied these
allegations.
As part of this lease, the parties are to equally share the utilities. Historically, the parties have
waited to pay the rent until after the City ofldaho Falls prepared and produced a utility statement for
The Brownstone Restaurant. Upon receipt of the utility statement, defendants would pay the entire
utility obligation for the restaurant and deduct plaintiffs portion from the rent due. This was done
for the ease of both parties so that only one check was written from defendants to plaintiff instead
of defendants writing a check to plaintiff for the full amount of the rent and plaintiff paying
defendants back its portion of the utilities. Often, plaintiff would pick up the City of Idaho Falls
utility statement, calculate its portion of the utilities, deduct this amount from the base rent and
present the statement to defendants for payment of rent (less plaintiffs portion of the utility).
Prior to the time the defendants began to operate The Brownstone Restaurant, significant
remodeling and renovation was necessary for the space subject to the lease. It was agreed that a
portion of these costs would be born by plaintiff. It was further agreed to allow plaintiff to amortize
the total amount owed over the course of ten ( 10) years interest free.

Plaintiff would repay

defendants at the rate of $372.00 per month. For the ease and convenience of the parties, instead of
plaintiff writing a check or paying defendants this amount on a monthly basis, the $3 72.00 was
deducted from the rental payment. The parties followed this pattern of payment since approximately
the beginning of this lease.
There were times when defendants made payments to plaintiff in excess of the base rent
required under the lease. There were other times that plaintiff, when calculating the amount owed,
2-
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would reduce the base rent by its portion of the utilities, but would not give defendants the full
$372.00 credit under their amortization agreement. If it is determined that defendants owe any
additional amounts to plaintiff, those amounts should be offset by the additional amounts paid by
defendants.
In June 2008, plaintiff through its attorneys served on defendants a list of claimed breaches
of the lease agreement and a demand for payment of claimed damages. The list of claimed damages
is almost identical to the claims contained in plaintiff's complaint. In July 2008 and again in
September 2008, plaintiff served on defendants "Three Day Notice to Pay Rent or Quit the
Premises". Said notices claimed that defendants were in breach of the lease, listed an amount that
would cure the breach and that if the stated amounts were paid, defendants would be in compliance
with the lease. In light of the June 2008 demand letter, at the time these three-day notices were
received, defendants believed that plaintiff was offering a compromise of the amounts sought.
Defendants acted on plaintiff's offer and paid the amount requested believing that they were in
compliance and could continue occupying the leased space.
During plaintiff's deposition, he was unable to state what the amounts listed in the three-day
notices were specifically for. Plaintiff did state that those amounts could not be for anything other
than base rent because under Idaho Code §6-301 et. seq, he could not seek anything other than base
rent. However, in December 2008, plaintiff served on defendants another "Three Day Notice to Pay
Rent or Quit the Premises". Accompanying this three-day notice plaintiff provided a list outlining
the items for which plaintiff was seeking payment. That list included amounts for unpaid property
taxes, additional rent based on the restaurant sales proceeds and gift certificates.
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Plaintiff seeks additional rent for use of an upstairs space for dry storage. At the time
defendants were using this space, the parties agreed this space could be used for an additional
$100.00 per month. Defendants paid this $100.00 per month until the Court ordered defendants to
vacate this space. Plaintiff accepted this $100.00 per month without complaint or request for
additional amounts until shortly prior to this lawsuit. Plaintiff claims no agreement was reached for
the use of this upstairs space and the rent sought for use of this space is $750.00 a month.
Plaintiff seeks additional rent for use of an area called "Space 16." Space 16 is outlined on
a drawing of the property which is Addendum C in the lease. However, as drawn on Addendum C,
Space# 16 does not actually exist. The area in dispute is actually a narrow hallway leading from the
outside directly to The Brownstone Restaurant. This area was used with plaintiffs permission until
said permission was revoked in 2009. Until 2007, plaintiff also used this area to store some of its
equipment. Plaintiff seeks an additional $100.00 per month for the use of this space. It is
defendants' contention that this space was used with permission and was included in the amount
already being paid for rent.
Plaintiff seeks additional rent for use of outdoor space by defendants. Since approximately
2002, defendants have used a portion of the sidewalk area in front of The Brownstone Restaurant
for additional seating. Addendum B in the lease allows defendants the use of an outdoor space. This
addendum does not contemplate additional rent being paid. Plaintiffs contention is that this
language only allows a second story wooden deck structure, and any other outdoor use is not allowed
under the lease. Defendant contends that the parties discussed several options, including the use of
the sidewalk in front of the Restaurant. Plaintiff allowed the use of this space without objection or
request for additional payment until just prior to this lawsuit.
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Plaintiff seeks additional amounts for defendants storing a cooler in an outdoor space
commonly referred to by plaintiff as "the pipe yard." This pipe yard is a fence enclosed area near
Eagle Rock Station. Defendants had purchased an unassembled walk-in cooler and stored it at the
pipeyard until the Court ordered its removal. Defendant contends that the parties discussed with
storing the cooler at the pipe yard and that plaintiff agreed defendant could store it at this location
without payment. Plaintiff denies that any agreement was reached to allow the storage of this cooler
without compensation. Plaintiff seeks $100.00 a month for the use of this space.
Plaintiff seeks payment for roofrepairs from defendants. Starting in approximately 2005,
there were roof repairs to the entire building occupied not only by the Brownstone, but by other
tenants as well. Briggs Roofing performed the repairs. Defendants paid approximately $7,100.00
toward these roof repairs. Plaintiff seeks an additional $5,000.00 for these repairs. The language
of the lease is unclear as to whether these costs should be born entirely by defendant, or shared with
plaintiff. Defendant contends the agreement of the parties was for both plaintiff and defendant to
share the costs. Plaintiff contends the defendant is responsible for all roof repair costs. Plaintiff
testified during his deposition that he compromised and settled the roofrepairs with Briggs Roofing
for approximately $5,500.00, an amount that has already been paid by defendant.
Prior to the trial, the Court ruled on summary judgment that defendant's rent is the greater
of the base rent listed or an amount based on the Brownstone Restaurant's sale proceeds. The Court
further ruled that the amount sought may be reduced if the trier of fact finds the parties entered into
an accord and satisfaction because of the three-day notices.
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APPLICABLE LAW
1.

This is a contract action involving a lease. "The interpretation of a contract begins

with the language of the contract itself. Crist on Viene Pentecostal Church v. Paz, 144 Idaho 304,
308, 160 P.3d 743, 747 (2007). If the language of the contract is unambiguous, then its meaning and
legal effect must be determined from its words. Id. A contract is ambiguous if it is reasonably
subject to conflicting interpretations. Id. Determining whether a contract is ambiguous is a question
of law over which the Court exercises free review. Id. Where a contract is ambiguous and the
parties mutual intent cannot be understood from the language, intent is a question for the trier of fact.
Farnsworth v. Dairymen's Creame,y Ass'n, 125 Idaho 866, 870, 876 P.2d 148, 152 (Ct. App.
1994)."
Bauchman-Kingston Partnership, LP, v. Haroldsen, 2008 Ida. Lexis 220, 5.
2.

There are clauses of the lease that are ambiguous and need to be interpreted by the

trier of fact. These include each party's responsibility for roof repairs and the use of the outdoor
space by defendants. There are other issues that the parties reached an oral agreement on, including
the use of the upstairs space and space# 16 for storage and the use of the pipeyard to store a cooler.
These agreements will be enforced if they are "complete, definite and certain in all its material terms,
or contains provisions which are capable in themselves of being reduced to certainty." Giacobbi
Square v. PEK Corp., 105 Idaho 346,348,670 P.2d 51, 53 (1983).
3.

Plaintiff is claiming additional amounts owed for the use of the upstairs space, space

#16, and the outdoor space. If the Court finds that there was no agreement for the use of this space,
plaintiff must still prove its damages. Damages need be proved only with a reasonable certainty.
This means that plaintiff must present proof of its claimed damages taking it out of the realm of
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speculation. Anderson & Nafziger v. G. T. Newcomb, Inc., 100 Idaho 175, 182-83 (1979) (citing Big
Butte Ranch, Inc. v. Grasmick, 91 Idaho 6,(1966)).

3.

Defendant has made a defense that the parties reached an accord and satisfaction

through the three-day notices. Idaho Code §28-3-310 addresses what is necessary for an accord and
satisfaction. This statute states:
( 1)
If a person against whom a claim is asserted proves that (I) that person in
good faith tendered an instrument to the claimant as full satisfaction of the claim, (ii)
the amount of the claim was unliquidated or subject to a bona fide dispute, and (iii)
the claimant obtained payment of the instrument, the following subsections apply.
(2)
Unless subsection (3) of this section applies, the claim is discharged if the
person against whom the claim is asserted proves that the instrument or an
accompanying written communication contained a conspicuous statement to the
effect that the instrument was tendered as full satisfaction of the claim.
Idaho Code §28-3-310.

"To establish an accord and satisfaction the parties accepting a new or different obligation must do
so knowingly and intentionally". Harris v. Wildcat Corp.,97 Idaho 884,886,556 P .2d 67, 69 (1976).
However, "an accord and satisfaction may be implied from the attendant circumstances". Id.
The elements of an accord and satisfaction are the following:
1.
A bona fide dispute as to the amount owed;
2.
That the debtor tendered an amount to the creditor with the intent that it be
in total satisfaction of the amount owed; and
3.
The creditor accepted payment in full satisfaction of the amount owed.

Beard v. George, 135 Idaho 635, 689, 23 P.3d 147 (2001).

In this action, plaintiff presented defendants with three separate three-day notices, none of
which contained any language limiting or clarifying the basis for the amounts sought. In the third
notice the plaintiff attached a breakdown of the amounts sought showing clearly that plaintiff was
using these three-day notices seeking payment for more than just rent. Said notices further stated
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that if the amounts were paid the defendants would be in compliance with the lease. Defendant was
under the reasonable belief that the amounts sought in those notices were for all issues plaintiff
raised in a previous demand letter. Plaintiff claimed the amounts could only be for base rent because
of the restrictions in Idaho Code §6-303 et. seq. However, Idaho Code §6-303 allows for three day
notices under situations where rent has not been paid (§6-303(2)) as well as for failure to perform
other conditions or covenants of the lease (§6-303(3)). Plaintiff had been seeking additional monies
from defendants for all issues contained in this complaint prior to each of the three-day notices.
Once the defendants paid the amounts requested in July and September, and the plaintiff accepted
these payments, the parties fully compromised all amounts due under any lease term as of the date
of the accord and satisfaction.
DATED this 21 st day of January, 2010.
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC

By:
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State ofldaho, resident of and with
my office in Idaho Falls, Idaho; that on the 2 I51 day of January, 2010, I caused a true and correct copy
of the foregoing TRIAL BRIEF to be served upon the following persons at the addresses below
their names either by depositing said document in the United States mail with the correct postage
thereon or by hand delivering or by transmitting by facsimile as set forth below.
[X] Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Facsimile

BRYAND SMITH ESQ
B J DRISCOLL ESQ
PO BOX 50731
IDAHO FALLS ID 83405-0731

THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC

By:

MJW:clm
67 53\028 Trial Brief
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

THE WATKINS COMPANY, LLC,
an Idaho limited liability
company,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MICHAEL STORMS and KATHY
BURGGRAF,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

MINUTE ENTRY
Case No.
CV-08-7258

On February 9, 2010, a court trial convened at the hour of
10:10 a.m. in open court at Idaho Falls,

Idaho, the Honorable

Joel E. Tingey, District Judge, presiding.
Mr. Jack Fuller, Court Reporter, and Mrs. Marlene Southwick,
Deputy Court Clerk, were present.
Mr. B. J. Driscoll appeared on behalf of the Plaintiff.

Mr.

Dane Watkins Sr. was at counsel table as a representative of the
Plaintiff.
Mr. Michael Whyte appeared on behalf of the Defendants.
Defendant Michael Storms and Kathy Burggraf were present at
counsel table.
Upon inquiry from the Court, the parties stated they are
ready to proceed.
Mr. Driscoll presented Plaintiff's opening statement.
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Mr. Whyte reserved an opening statement for later.
Mr. Dane Watkins was called as a witness.
under oath and took the stand.
Watkins.

He was placed

Mr. Driscoll inquired of Mr.

Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 - Commercial Lease - was marked,

offered, and admitted without objection.

Plaintiff's Exhibit

4

-

Brownstone Monthly Rent Deposit forms - was marked, offered and
admitted without objection.

Plaintiff's Exhibit 3 - documents re:

Brownstone monthly gross sales and sales tax payments - was
marked, offered and admitted without objection.
A morning recess was conducted.

Trial resumed at 11:05 a.m. with all parties present.

Mr.

Dane Watkins retook the witness stand subject to direct
examination by Mr. Driscoll. Plaintiff's Exhibit 26 - 6/12/08
letters from Smith to Williams and Burggraf - was marked, offered
and admitted without objection.

Plaintiff's Exhibit 24 - 1/08/07

letter from Watkins to Smith - was marked, offered and admitted
without objection.

Plaintiff's Exhibit 30 - pictures of upstairs

storage - was marked, offered and admitted without objection.
Plaintiff's Exhibit 32 - photos of sidewalk area - was marked,
offered and admitted without objection.

Plaintiff's Exhibit 31 -

photos of #16 - was marked, offered and admitted without
objection.

Plaintiff's Exhibit 33 - photos of "pipeyard" storage

area - was marked, offered and admitted without objection.
Trial recessed for lunch break.
p.m.
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Trial will resume at 1:30

Trial continued at 1:36 with all parties present.
Mr.

Dane Watkins retook the witness stand subject to direct

examination by Mr. B. J. Driscoll.

Plaintiff's Exhibit 8 - check

#3934 dated 3/15/05 from Brownstone Companies to Watkins $1780.00
- was marked, offered and admitted without objection.

Plaintiff's

Exhibit 10 - check #4146 dated 12/23/05 from Brownstone to Watkins
for

was

$5,000.00

objection.

marked,

offered

Plaintiff's Exhibit

14

dated 6/22/07

admitted

check #1225

from Brownstone to Watkins for $500.00 admitted without objection.

and

without

dated

was marked,

6/21/07

offered and

Plaintiff's Exhibit 15 - check #4187

from Watkins to Briggs Roofing for $5500. 00 -

was

marked, offered and admitted.
Mr.

Whyte

moved

for

dismissal

of

Count

4.

Mr.

Driscoll

Mr.

Watkins.

presented argument in opposition to the motion.
Mr.

Driscoll

continued

Plaintiff's Exhibit 16 to Waters

direct

examination

of

check #4621 dated 12/04/07 from Watkins

Construction for

admitted without objection.

$4,000.00

-

was

marked,

offered and

Plaintiff's Exhibit 25 - letter dated

5/5/08 from Watkins to Storms - was marked, offered and admitted.
Plaintiff's
marked,

Exhibit

offered

18

and

Three

admitted

Day

Notice

without

to

Pay

objection.

Rent

was

Plaintiff's

Exhibit 21 - check #1542 dated 7/11/08 from Brownstone to Watkins
for

$17,000.00

Exhibit 19 dated

9/12/08

MINUTE ENTRY

was

marked,

offered

and

admitted.

Plaintiff's

Three Day Notice to Pay Rent of Quit the Premises
was

marked,

offered

-3-
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and

admitted

without

Plaintiff's Exhibit 20 - Brownstone Rent Deducted Due

objection.

- was marked, offered and admitted without objection.

Plaintiff's

Exhibit 22 - check #1583 dated 9/14/08 from Brownstone to Watkins
for $6219.00 - was marked offered and admitted.
An afternoon recess was conducted.
Trial resumed at 2:25 p.m. with all parties present.
Mr.

Dane

Watkins

was

on

the

witness

stand.

continued direct examination of Mr. Watkins.

Mr.

Driscoll

Plaintiff's Exhibits

34, 35 and 37 were admitted for illustrative purposes only.
Mr. Whyte inquired on cross-examination.
C

Three

Day

Notice

to

Pay

Rent

was

Defendant's Exhibit
marked,

offered

and

admitted without objection.
Trial

was

in recess

for

the day.

Trial

will

continue at

10:00 a.m. on Wednesday, February 10, 2010.

On February 10, 2010, a court trial reconvened at the hour
of 10:05 a.m. in open court at Idaho Falls,

Idaho, the Honorable

Joel E. Tingey, District Judge, presiding.
Mr. Jack Fuller, Court Reporter, and Mrs. Marlene Southwick,
Deputy Court Clerk, were present.
Mr. B. J. Driscoll appeared on behalf of the Plaintiff.

Mr.

Dane Watkins Sr. was at counsel table as a representative of the
Plaintiff.
Mr. Michael Whyte appeared on behalf of the Defendants.
Defendant Michael Storms and Kathy Burggraf were present at

MINUTE ENTRY
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counsel table.
Mr. Dane Watkins retook the witness stand.
still under oath.

Mr. Watkins was

Mr. Whyte cross-examined Mr. Watkins.

Mr.

Driscoll inquired on redirect examination.
(NOTE:

There was a power surge off/on with loss of recording.

I

rebooted and did another mic test.)
(Back on the record)

Mr. Driscoll moved to admit Defendant's

Exhibit A - copy of lease agreement (same as exhibit 1) - for
clarification purposes.

Exhibit A was admitted without objection.

Mr. Whyte inquired on recross-examination.

Mr. Watkins was

excused form the witness stand.
Plaintiff rested.
Mrs. Kathy Burggraf was called as a witness and placed under
oath.

Mr. Whyte inquired of Mrs. Burggraf on direct examination.
A morning recess was conducted.
Trial resumed at 11:18 a.m. with all parties present.
Mrs. Kathy Burggraf retook the witness stand subject to

cross-examination by Mr. Driscoll.

Mrs. Burggraf was excused from

the witness stand.
Mr. Michael Storms was called as a witness and placed under
oath.

Mr. Whyte inquired on direct examination.
Trial recessed for lunch break.
Trial resumed at 1:30 p.m. with all parties present.
Mr. Michael Storms retook the witness stand subject to direct

examination by Mr. Whyte.

MINUTE ENTRY

Defendant's Exhibit H - Utility
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Summation 9/07 - was marked, offered and admitted without
objection.

Defendant's Exhibit I - rent check 9/07 - was marked,

offered and admitted without objection.

Defendant's Exhibit J -

two check stubs - was marked, offered and admitted without
objection.

Mr. Driscoll cross-examined Mr. Storms.

The

Deposition of Michael Storms was published and presented to the
witness.
An afternoon recess was conducted.
Trial continued at 3:42 p.m. with all parties present.
Mr. Michael Storms retook the witness stand.
under oath.
examination.

He was still

Mr. Whyte inquired of Mr. Storms on redirect
Mr. Storms was excused from the witness stand.

Defendant rested.
Mr. Dane Watkins was recalled to the witness stand.
still under oath.

He was

Mr. Driscoll inquired of Mr. Watkins.

Whyte inquired on cross-examination.

Mr.

Mr. Watkins was excused from

the witness stand.
Plaintiffs rested on rebuttal.
The parties agreed to simultaneously submit briefing by
February 22, 2010 in lieu of closing arguments.
Court was thus adjourned.

/)(Q:Gt~K/
( d r i c t Judge
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CERTICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the
I/ day of February, 2010, I
caused a true and correct c o p ~ the foregoing document to
be delivered to the following:
RONALD LONGMORE

Deput~ourt Clerk
Bryan D. Smith
B. J. Driscoll
PO Box 50731
Idaho Falls, ID

83405

Michael J. Whyte
2635 Channing Way
Idaho Falls, ID 83404
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PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT LIST INDEX
Watkins v. Storms, et al.
Bonneville County Case No. CV-08-77258
Trial Date: 02/09/2010
Exhibit
No.
1.

2.

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.
13.
14.

15.

16.

Description
Commercial Lease and Deposit
Receipt dated 7/31/1996 with
Addendum A, Addendum B, Exhibit
C, and Addendum D
The Watkins Company, LLC
documents
Documents re: Brownstone monthly
gross sales and sales tax payments
"Brownstone Monthly Rent Deposit"
forms
Intentionally omitted
Intentionally omitted
Invoice 2005-105 dated 1/21/2005
from Briggs Roofing to Watkins
Enterprises for $2,680.00
Ck #3934 dated 3/15/2005 from
Brownstone Companies, Inc. to
Watkins Enterprises for $1,780.00
Ck #2051 stub dated 5/18/2005 from
The Watkins Company to Briggs
Roofing for $2,330.00
Ck #4146 dated 12/23/2005 from
Brownstone Companies, Inc. to
Watkins Enterprise for $5,000.00
Invoice #2006-226 dated 5/2/2006
from Briggs Roofing to Watkins
Enterprises for $12,135.00
Intentionally omitted
Invoice 120 from Briggs Roofing
Company to Watkins Enterprise
Ck #1225 dated 6/21/2007 from
Brownstone Companies, Inc. to Dane
Watkins for $500.00
Ck #4187 dated 6/22/2007 from The
Watkins Company, LLC to Briggs
Roofing Company for $5,500.00
Ck #4621 dated 12/4/2007 from The
Watkins Company, LLC to Waters
Construction for $4,000.00

Offer Admit Object Refuse
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v
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v/
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Comment

18.
19.
20.
21.

22.

23.
24.
25.
26.

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

40.

41.

Intentionally omitted
Three Day Notice to Pay Rent or
Quit the Premises dated 7/10/2008
Three Day Notice to Pay Rent or
Quit the Premises dated 9/12/2008
"Brownstone Rent Deducted Due"
Ck #1542 dated 7/11/2008 from
Brownstone Companies, Inc. to
Watkins & Watkins for $17,900.00
Ck #1583 dated 9/14/2008 from
Brownstone Companies, Inc. to
Watkins Enterprises for $6,219.00
Intentionally omitted
1/8/2007 letter from Dane Watkins to
Marvin Smith
5/5/2008 letter from Dane Watkins to
Mike Storms
6/12/2008 letters from Bryan D.
Smith to Brad Williams and Kathy
Burggraf
9/23/2008 letter from Michael J.
Whyte to Bryan D. Smith
4/30/2009 letter from B. J. Driscoll
to Michael J. Whyte
4/13/2009 letter from B. J. Driscoll
to Michael J. Whyte
Photos of upstairs storage area
Photos of Space #16
Photos of sidewalk area
Photos of "pipeyard" storage area
Rent, Late Fees, And Interest
Summary
Unjust Enrichment Summary
Intentionally omitted
Total Damage Summary
Expired gifts certificates from
Brownstone
Defendants' Answers to Plaintiff's
First Set of Interrogatories dated
7/7/2009
Defendants' Responses to Plaintiff's
First Set of Requests for Production
dated 7/7/2009
Defendants' Supplemental
Responses to Plaintiff's First Set of
Requests for Production dated

v,J
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v

v
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v
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V
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v

.p-

#

/

;r):

I I r,/
•v

v
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V
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V
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V
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V
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42.

43.

44.

45.
46.

47.

8/l 1/2009
Defendants· Supplemental Answers
to Plaintiffs First Set of
Interrogatories dated l 0/27/2009
Defendants' Second Supplemental
Responses to Plaintiff's First set of
Interrogatories and Requests for
Production dated l l/12/2009
Affidavit of Michael Storms dated
12/10/2009
Affidavit of Michael Storms dated
7/28/2009
Affidavit of Michael Storms in
Support of his Objection to
Plaintiffs Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment dated
12/23/2009
Affidavit of Kathy Burggraf dated
7/29/2009

V
V

v'

H
I
l
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Michael J. Whyte, Esq., ISB #4645
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC
2635 Channing Way
,,.
Idaho Falls ID 83404
Telephone (208)522-1230
Fax (208)522-1277
rJ.

,

I,

Attorney for Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STAJ'E OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
THE WATKINS COMPANY, LLC,
an Idaho limited liability company,
Plaintiff,
V.

MICHAEL STORMS and KATHY
BURGGRAF,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-08-7258

POST-TRIAL MEMORANDUM
ACCELERATION OF RENT

COME NOW defendants, by and through their attorney of record and hereby submit this
Post-Trial Memorandum regarding the acceleration of rent. At the conclusion of the trial there
remained the issue of whether plaintiff was entitled to an acceleration of rent if the court finds
defendants in default of the parties' lease agreement. This memorandum will address that single
issue.
During the trial there was a question whether the plaintiff was seeking an eviction of
defendants if the Court finds that there was a breach of the lease. Without waiving any defenses
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presented during the trial, but for purposes of this memorandum it will be presumed that defendants
breached the lease and the plaintiff is seeking an eviction based on that breach.
The lease agreement between the parties contains a clause outlining the possible damages
afforded the owner if there is a breach. One such remedy is the amount of unpaid rent for the
balance of the term of the lease. Plaintiff seeks this acceleration of the rent not yet due. During the
trial plaintiff testified that if there is an eviction plaintiff will be in control of the property subject
to this lease and would have the opportunity to rent it to a third party.
Plaintiff has an affirmative duty to mitigate his damages through finding a new tenant and
renting the available space. This rule was outlined and upheld in Industrial Leasing Corporation
v. Thomason, 96 ID 574, 532 P.2d 916 (1974).
However, it is our view that the best rule is that suggested in Young Electric Sign Co.
v. Capps, supra, i.e. that a lessor should be required to mitigate his damages through
a reasonable endeavor to relet the property unless the property is so unique that it
could be said as a matter of law that reasonable efforts would not be productive.
Such a rule would discourage idleness of productive property and would be in
keeping with the other generally accepted damages rules in other commercial
transactions. E.g., in the rental ofreal property, most jurisdictions place a duty upon
a landlord to seek new tenants when the lessees have refused to pay rent as provided
in the lease agreement and have vacated the property. Martin v; Siegley, 123 Wash.
683, 212 P. 1057 (1923); Wright v. Baumann, 239 Or. 410, 398 P .2d 119 (1965). As
stated by the Oregon Supreme Court in the Wright case:
"*** [I]t is important that the rules for awarding damages should be such as
to discourage even persons against whom wrongs have been committed from
passively suffering economic loss which could be averted by reasonable efforts***."
McCormick, Damages, p.127 (1935). 398 P.2d at 121.

Thomason at 577.
This application outlined in Thomason was applied to a real property lease in Olsen v.
Country Club Sport, Inc., 110 Idaho 789, 718 P.2d 1227 (1985). In Olsen, the landlord (Olsen)
2-
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brought an action for damages, following a default of lease and retaking possession of the leased
premises. Prior to the lawsuit being filed, Olsen served on defendants a notice of breach and
specifically advised that he was electing to immediately accelerate all rent due under the agreement.
Because defendants could not cure the default, Olsen took possession of the lease property and filed
suit for damages, including rent which was accelerated pursuant to the written lease provisions.
With regard to the accelerated provision of the lease, the Idaho Supreme Court stated the following:
The trial court correctly noted that where a lessee has breached a lease before
expiration of the lease's term has occurred, the lessor, at common law, had three
remedies: ( l) treating the lease as terminated and resuming possession; (2) retaking
possession of the premises for the benefit of the lessee, and holding the lessee liable
for the difference in rent between what he or she in good faith was able to recover by
reletting the premises and what was due under the lease; and (3) doing nothing and
collecting the full rent due under the lease. Centurian Development Ltd. v. Kenford
Co., 60 A.D.2d 96,400 N.Y.S.2d 263 (1977).
The trial court also correctly noted that the third option is no longer as viable as in
former times, at least in some contexts. In Industrial Leasing Corp. v. Thomason, 96
Idaho 574,532 P.2d 916 (1974), our Supreme Court provided us with the guidance
of this holding:
We therefore hold that the lessor of personal property is not
unconditionally entitled to the full amount of the rentals reserved in
the lease as damages in the event of breach of the lease. If the leased
property is of such a kind that the lessor may reasonably anticipate the
existence of a market for its re-lease or sale, the lessor is under a duty
to use "commercially reasonable" efforts to release or sell the
property to mitigate damages according to the following rules:
1. If the lessee notifies the lessor of his intention not to continue the lease,
or if the lessor becomes aware of the lessee's intention not to perform the
lease by breach or otherwise, and if the leased property is returned to the
lessor or made available to the lessor, then the lessor is under a duty to
attempt to mitigate the damages sustained by the lessee's breach by releasing or selling the property and setting off the amount received against the
damages sustained by reason of the lessee's breach of the lease. If a good faith
attempt to rent or sell the property proves fruitless, the lessor is entitled to his
full rental payment, plus expenses reasonably incurred in attempting to re-
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lease or sell the property less expenses of performance saved by the breach
(e.g., costs of maintenance, insurance, etc.). If the property is released in good
faith (i.e., at a rate or price which is commercially reasonable under the
circumstances of the case), the lessor's damages are the rental called for in the
breached lease, together with the reasonable expenses of preserving the
property and re-leasing it, less the amount received in mitigation by the
release and any expenses of performance saved by the breach of the lease. See
Bennett v. Associated Food Stores, Inc., 118 Ga.App. 711, 165 S.E.2d 581
(1968); see also, Uniform Commercial Code-Sales, Part 7, Remedies, LC.§§
28-2-701 to 28-2-710, for treatment of the analogous problem under the law
of sales. Id. at 577, 532 P.2d at 919 (footnote omitted) (emphasis
added).(fn3).
Olsen at 794.
In this action, under the lease agreement the plaintiff has the option to continue the lease even
if there has been a breach of the lease. If plaintiff takes this option, plaintiff would clearly not be
entitled to any accelerated rent because he would receive the rent as it was paid in future
installments. During the trial, plaintiff was inconsistent with his testimony as to whether he would
be seeking an eviction or a continuation of the lease. Plaintiff testified several times that he did not
want to evict defendants and just wanted to be made whole by the payment of the past due rent.
There were other times when plaintiff testified that he wanted to evict. Given the inconsistent
testimony, it is difficult, if not impossible to determine plaintiffs request of the Court. However,
for purpose of this memorandum, as stated earlier, presuming the plaintiff will seek an eviction, the
plaintiff still must mitigate his damages prior to receiving any accelerated rent damages. The lease
allows for payment of accelerated rent upon a breach; however, as outlined in both Thomason and
Olsen, the rule in Idaho is that plaintiff must mitigate the damages by "commercially reasonable"
efforts to release the property. There was no testimony that the property is of such unique nature that
reasonable efforts to re-lease would not be productive. It is a finished building located along the
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Snake River in Idaho Falls, Idaho and therefore presumable would be attractive to other potential
tenants. Because of plaintiffs duty to mitigate its damages, and no evidence to suggest that it would
be unable to lease this space, no acceleration of lease is ordered and that claim of defendants is
denied.
Plaintiff wants to shift the burden to mitigate its damages by requiring defendants to come
forward with evidence that plaintiff would be able to re-lease the property in mitigation. First of all,
if plaintiff is in possession of the real property there is nothing to suggest that it would not be able
to re-lease the property. Second, this would completely undo plaintiffs duty and place plaintiff in
a position to obtain a windfall. Without requiring plaintiff to first actually mitigate its damages
before any award of accelerated damages, plaintiff would be in a position wherein it receives
accelerated damages from defendants and receives rental income when it re-leases the property. This
would be contrary to the policy stated in Young Electric Sign Co. v Capps 94 Idaho 518, 49 l P.2d
57 ( 1971) and confirmed in Thomason: "[A]s a general proposition ... the purpose or objective of the
court is to place the injured party ... in the position no better and no worse than he would have
occupied had the contract been performed." King v. Beatrice Foods, 89 Idaho 52, 58-59, 402 P.2d
966, 969 (1965); Young Electric Sign 94 Idaho at 522; Thomason at 577.
To allow plaintiff recovery of accelerated damages without the requirement of mitigation first
would in essence be considered a penalty imposed against defendants. Contractual provisions which
include penalties are void and unenforceable.
Generally speaking, parties to a contract may agree upon liquidated damages in
anticipation of a breach, in any case where the circumstances are such that accurate
determination of the damages would be difficult or impossible, and provided that the
liquidated damages fixed by the contract bear a reasonable relation to actual
damages. But, where the forfeiture or damage fixed by the contract is arbitrary and
5-
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bears no reasonable relation to the anticipated damage, and is exorbitant and
unconscionable, it is regarded as a 'penalty,' and the contractual provision therefor is
void and unenforceable." Graves v. Cupic, 75 Idaho 451 at 456, 272 P.2d 1020 at
1023 (1954).

Young Electric Sign 94 Idaho at 521.
In this case awarding the claimed accelerated rent payments without requiring mitigation
results in a penalty because there is no relation between this amount and the anticipated damage.
The amount sought to enforce is further exorbitant and unconscionable. The lease between plaintiffs
and defendants has an additional eighteen years remaining. Plaintiff seeks immediate payment of
the next eighteen years rent without having to mitigate its damages. However this amount sought
bears no reasonable relation to plaintiffs anticipated damages. Plaintiff testified that with an
eviction it would be in control of the real property and would be able to lease the property to a third
party. It can be anticipated that the plaintiff will be able to re-lease the property in the future and
recover most, if not all, of the rent which would be due under the lease. Again, requiring defendant
to provide evidence of the ability to lease the premises instead of requiring plaintiff to mitigate the
damages would allow the plaintiff to recover damages far in excess of the anticipated damages and
would be contrary to the policy of placing an injured party in a position no better and no worse than
had the original lease been performed.
The requested accelerated damages are further a penalty because there exists the actual ability
to accurately determine the damages which plaintiff might suffer. The damages can be accurately
determined by requiring mitigation first and then calculating the difference (if any) between what
would be received under this lease and the amount to be received under the lease to the third party.
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Allowing recovery of the full accelerated rent plus additional amounts to be received after plaintiff
leases to a third party is exorbitant and unconscionable. This penalty should not be allowed.
Because there are still questions regarding plaintiffs actual damages, and the rental value that
will be received after mitigation, the Court should deny plaintiffs request for accelerated rent. At
the most, the Court could reserve this ruling until such time as the plaintiff actually mitigates the
damages so that no penalty is assessed against defendants and plaintiff is placed in a position no
better and no worse than if the lease were completed.
DATED this 22 nd day of February, 2010.
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC

By:
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, resident of and with
my office in Idaho Falls, Idaho; that on the 22 nd day of February, 2010, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing POST-TRIAL MEMORANDUM: ACCELERATION OF RENT to be served
upon the following persons at the addresses below their names either by depositing said document
in the United States mail with the correct postage thereon or by hand delivering or by transmitting
by facsimile as set forth below.
[ ] Mail
[X] Hand Delivery
[ ] Facsimile

BRYAN D SMITH ESQ
B J DRISCOLL ESQ
PO BOX 50731
IDAHO FALLS ID 83405-0731

THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC

By:

MJW:clm
675 3\030 Post-trial Memo
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Bryan D. Smith, Esq. - ISB #4411
B . .1. Driscoll, Esq. - ISB # 7010
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC
414 Shoup Ave.
P.O. Box 50731
Idaho Falls. Idaho 83405
Telephone: (208) 524-0731
Facsimile: (208) 529-4166
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

THE WATKINS COMPANY, LLC,
an Idaho limited liability company,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-08-7258

PLAINTIFF'S CLOSING BRIEF

V.

MICHAEL STORMS and KATHY
BURGGRAF,
Defendants.

COMES NOW the plaintiff: The Watkins Company, LLC, an Idaho Limited
Liability Company ("Watkins"), by and through counsel of record, and submits its
closing brief. For the convenience of the court, Watkins has organized its arguments in
relation to the ten counts contained in its Amended Complaint. In light of the evidence
from trial and the applicable law, the comi should enter judgment against the defendants,
Michael Storms ("Storms") and Kathy Burggraf ("Burggraf'), as set forth herein.
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I.

THE COURT SHOULD ENTER JUDGMENT fOR WATKINS ON COUNT
ONE IN THE AMOUNT OF $28,988 BECAUSE STORMS MATERIALLY
BREACHED THE LEASE BY FAILING TO PAY RENT AND LATE FEES.
A.

Storms Breached The Lease By Failing To Pay Percentage Rent To
Watkins.

This court previously rules as a matter of law that the language from Addendum
A of the Commercial Lease and Deposit Receipt ("Lease") is unambiguous and provides
"for payment ofrent through the term of the Lease (not including the initial months of the
lease covered by prepaid rent) of 5% of gross sales, if such amount exceeds the
designated base amount of rent." 1
By his own admission at trial, Storms did not pay Watkins over $20,000 of the
percentage rent due since November 2003. 2 This court should conclude that Storms
breached the Lease by not paying the percentage rent.
B.

Storms Breached The Lease By Failing To Pay Late Fees To Watkins.

The Lease provides that if the rent "is not paid within 2 days after due date,
Tenant agrees to pay a late charge of $100 plus interest at 1% per month on the
delinquent amount." 3 Unfortunately, the Lease does not establish a "due date."
At trial, the parties disagreed on the due date. Watkins claimed that the due date
was the first day of each month. Dane Watkins testified that the first date of the month is
the due date for the 40-plus leases Watkins manages and the custom in this area. He
testified that he had tried for years to have Storms pay the rent on the first. Storms never
testified to a specific due date, but argued that the due date was sometime between the
8th to the 12th of the month after the release of the electricity bill.

1

Seep. 1 of Order filed January 8, 2010.
The damages Watkins seeks in this action only go back to November 2003 based on the applicable statute
of limitations.
3 See 12 of Plaintiffs Exhibit l.
2

PLAINTIFF'S CLOSING BRIEF - Page 2
F:\CLIENTS\BDS\7973\Pleadings\040 Closing Brief.doc

.,

... ·""

.i. ( b

"Unless otherwise agreed, periodic rent is payable at the beginning of any term of
one month or less and otherwise in equal monthly installments at the beginning of each
month." UNJFORM RESIDENTTAL LANDLORD & TENANT ACT§ 1.401(c). 4 Fm1her, if a
lease agreement does not expressly identify the date that rent payments are due each
month, then the rent is due on the date "either expressly made or to be gathered by
necessary implication from the acts and circumstances of the pai1ies or by custom or
usage in the community." 49 AM.JUR.2D Landlord and Tenant § 555. 5
Here, the com1 should find the "due date" was the first clay of each month because
the Lease did not establish a specific due date. See UNIFORM RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD &
TENANT ACT, supra. Further, Watkins' testimony is evidence of the custom and usage in
the community that monthly rent is due on the first of each month. See 49 AM.JUR.2D

landlord and Tenant§ 555.
At trial, Storms did not identify a specific date when the rent is due each month.
As a matter of horn book law, "In construing a written instrument, this Comi must
consider it as a whole and give meaning to all provisions of the writing to the extent
possible."' Selkirk Seed Co. v. State Ins. Fund, 135 Idaho 434,437 (2000). Further, "as
between two permissible constructions, that which establishes a valid contract is
preferred to one which does not, since it is reasonable to suppose that the paiiies meant
something by their agreement, and were not engaged in an attempt to do a vain and
meaningless thing." Morgan v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 68 Idaho 506, 519 (1948).
Storms' interpretation would render the express late charge of $100 meaningless because
4

Although it appears the Idaho Legislature has not formally adopted the Uniform Landlord and Tenant Act,
ldaho appellate cou11s have cited the Act with approval. See Wright v. Brady, 126 ldaho 671, 674 (Ct.App.
1995).
5 Idaho appellate com1s routinely cite 49 AM.JUR.2D Landlord and Tenant with approval. See, e.g., JR.
Simplot Co. v. Rycair, Inc., 138 Idaho 557,564 (2003).
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he never identifies a due date that would trigger the two day grace period and the
subsequent late charge. Such an interpretation is disfavored at law.
Based on the foregoing, this court should find that the "due date" for the monthly
rent was the first day of each month. Because Watkins testified and Sto1ms admitted that
Storms never paid the rent by the first, this court should find that Storms did not pay rent
by the due date each month and conclude that Storms breached the Lease in this regard.
C.

Storms Breached The Lease By Failing To Pay Interest To Watkins.

The Lease expressly provides that the tenants are liable for "1 % per month on the
delinquent amount." 6 The undisputed evidence at trial showed Storms failed to pay over
$20,000 in percentage rent since November 2003. ln Watkins' evidence and accounting,
Storms never paid any interest on past due, "delinquent" amounts. For his part, Storms
never claimed to have paid any interest on these past due amounts. As such, Storms has
breached the Lease by failing to pay interest expressly required on delinquent amounts.
Because interest is typically a post-judgment issue, and because the amount of Storms'
liability for interest depends on the amount of Sto1ms' liability on the other claims,
Watkins cannot provide an accurate amount of interest due pursuant to the Lease, but
reserves the issue for determination after entry of judgment.
D.

Storms Failed To Establish His Affirmative Defense Of Accord And
Satisfaction.

Idaho Code Section 28-3-310 provides in pertinent part as follows:
ACCORD AND SATISFACTION BY USE OF TI~STRUMENT. (1) If a
person against whom a claim is asserted proves that (i) that person in good
faith tendered an instrument to the claimant as full satisfaction of the
claim, (ii) the amount of the claim was unliguidated or subject to a bona
fide dispute, and (iii) the claimant obtained payment of the instrument, the
following subsections apply.
6

See ~2 of Plaintiffs Exhibit 1.

PLAINTIFF'S CLOSING BRIEF - Page 4
F:\CLIENTS\BDS\7973\Pleadings\040 Closing Brief.doc

,I

l

7 d,-,

(2) Unless subsection (3) of this section applies, the claim is
discharged if the person against whom the claim is asse1ied proves that the
instrument or an accompanying written communication contained a
conspicuous statement to the effect that the instrument was tendered as
full satisfaction of the claim.
(4) A claim is discharged if the person against whom the claim is
asserted proves that within a reasonable time before collection of the
instrument was initiated, the claimant, or an agent of the claimant having
direct responsibility with respect to the disputed obligation, knew that the
instrument was tendered in full satisfaction of the claim.
(Emphasis added.)
In Ashby v. Hubbard, 100 Idaho 67, 69 (1979), the Idaho Supreme Court
explained as follows:
This Comi has held that in order for the acceptance of a check to
amount to an accord and satisfaction, where it is for a lesser sum than
claimed by the creditor to be due, the conditions must be plain, definite
and certain by the debtor that he is giving such check in complete
settlement of the account between him and his creditor and that
acceptance thereof shall close the account or controversy . ... An accord
and satisfaction cannot arise by reason of the payment of a sum less than is
due, unless it clearly appears not only that this was the intention of the
payor, but also the payee express()' agreed to it or was bound to know of
the intention at the time of the acceptance. It cannot be too strongly
stated that an accord and satisfaction can never be implied from
language of doubtful meaning . ... [A]n agreement to compromise or
settle a claim is essential to finding an accord and satisfaction ...
(Emphasis added.) As the Idaho Supreme Comi explained more recently, "Since an
accord and satisfaction is a substituted contract, the essentials of a valid contract must be
present, including: proper subject matter, competent parties, a meeting of the minds, and
consideration." Shore v. Peterson, 146 Idaho 903, 909 (2009) (citation omitted).
Here, Storms argues that his $17,900 payment in response to the July 2008 three
day notice constituted an accord and satisfaction-and then his subsequent payment of
$6,219 in response to the September 2008 three-day notice constituted another accord
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and satisfaction. However, Storms has failed to prove the necessary elements for this
defense.
Importantly, Storms failed to prove that either of his checks "contained a
conspicuous statement to the effect that the instrument was tendered as full satisfaction of
the claim.'· I.C. § 28-3-310. The $17,900 check gives no indication that he intended the
payment to fully satisfy a disputed claim. 7 The $6,219 check is similarly deficient of any
language suggesting Storms intended the payment to fully satisfy the claim. 8 Storms'
checks contained no language suggesting "payment in full" or "without recourse" or any
similar language indicating the "instrument was tendered as full satisfaction of the
claim.'· As such, Storms cannot establish an accord and satisfaction under Idaho Code
Section 28-3-310.
Stated another way, Storms failed to provide "plain, definite and certain"
language that he paid the checks "in complete settlement of the account between him and
his creditor." See Ashby, supra. Storms testified that he never communicated with
Watkins about either of the three-day notices. He just received them and paid them. As
such, Storms failed to prove he "clearly" expressed his intention to Watkins that the
payment was in full satisfaction. Further, there was no evidence that Watkins "expressly
agreed to [Storms' intention] or was bound to know of the intention at the time of
acceptance." Id.
Essentially, Storms asks this court to imply an accord and satisfaction from his
payments to Watkins based on the reference to "compliance with the lease" contained in
the three-day notices, but the Idaho Supreme Court has clearly stated that "an accord and

7
8

See Plaintiffs Exhibit 21.
See Plaintiffs Exhibit 22.
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satisfaction can never be implied.from language of doub(ful meaning." See Ashby,
supra. The evidence showed a complete lack of communication between Watkins and

Storms. Storms himself testified that he merely "hoped" that the $6,219 payment would
resolve all issues between him and Watkins. Viewing the accord and satisfaction as a
"substituted contract," since there was no requisite "meeting of the minds," see Shore,
supra, there can be no accord and satisfaction.

E.

The Court Should Enter Judgment To Watkins On Cow1t I In The Amount
Of $28,988.

Watkins claims that Storms owed $21,888 in unpaid percentage rent. 9 Storn1s
agreed with Watkins' calculations except he claimed credit for an additional percentage
rent payment of $930 in August-September 2007. However, the $930 does not match
with the amounts due in August and September 2007. In fact, the $930 is greater than the
amounts due at that time. On the other hand, Watkins testified that the Lease required
Storms to make payments to Watkins for property taxes and that Storms' prope1iy tax
payments for 2008 and 2009 were around $900. This court should give greater weight to
Watkins' testimony than Storms. For Storms to claim he overpaid the actual percentage
rent due despite having the infonnation necessary to calculate the exact amount due
within his possession is not credible in light of his more consistent refusal to pay any
percentage rent. On the other hand, Watkins' testimony is more credible that Storms
owes $21,888 in unpaid percentage rent.
The parties agree that Storms and Burggraf never paid the rent on the first of the
month for the 75 month period from November 2003 through February 2010. Storms and
Burggraf paid the $100 per month late fee for 4 months from April 2008 through July

9

See Plaintiffs Exhibit 34.
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2008, but did not pay the $100 per month late fee for the remaining 71 months, for a total
of$7,100.
As such, the court should enter judgment to Watkins against Storms and Burggraf
on Count I in the total amount of $28,988.
II.

THE COURT SHOULD ENTER JUDGMENT FOR WATKINS ON COUNT
TWO IN THE AMOUNT OF $1,007,500 BECAUSE THE ACCELERATION
CLAUSE IS AN ENFORCEABLE CONTRACTUAL REMEDY.
A.

The Acceleration Clause In The Lease Is Enforceable As The Lessor's
Contractual Remedy.

Paragraph 22 of the Lease, captioned "REMEDIES OF OWNER ON
DEF AULT," provides in pertinent part as follows:
In the event of any breach of this lease by Lessee, Lessor may, at
his option, terminate the lease and recover from Lessee: (a) the worth at
the time of the award of the unpaid rent which was earned at the time of
termination; (b) the worth at the time of award of the amount by which
the unpaid rent which would have been earned after termination until
the time of the award exceeds the amount of such rental loss that the
Lessee [i.e., Storms] proves could have been reasonably avoided; (c) the
worth at the time of award of the amount by which the unpaid rent for the
balance of the term after the time of award exceeds the amount of such
rental loss that Lessee [i.e., Storms] proves could be reasonably avoided;
and (d) any other amount necessary to compensate Lessor for all detriment
proximately caused by Lessee's failure to perform his obligations under
the lease or which in the ordinary course of things would be likely to result
therefrom. 10
Idaho law recognizes the enforceability of acceleration clauses in general. See

Parrott v. Wallace, 127 Idaho 306, 310-311 (Ct.App. 1995). As to commercial leases
specifically, the Idaho Supreme Court has enforced a judgment for accelerated lease
payments. LeaseFirst v. Burns, 131 Idaho 158 (1998).

10 See~ 22 of Plaintiffs Exhibit l (emphasis added). See also~ 22 of Defendants' Exhibit "A" admitted
for the limited purpose of providing any language rendered unreadable by the hole punches in Plaintiffs
Exhibit I.

PLAINTIFF'S CLOSING BRIEF- Page 8
F:\CLlENTS\BDS\7973\Pleadings\040 Closing Brief.doc

Discussing the purpose and validity of accelerated rent clauses, one Pennsylvania
court explained, "The acceleration clause is viewed as a guarantee to the lessor that he
will receive immediately all of the monies (or other compensation) to which he is entitled
under the lease without having to harass a reluctant tenant as periodical payments
become due." Pierce v. Hoffstot, 236 A.2d 828, 803 (Pa.Super. 1967) (emphasis added).

Numerous federal and state jurisdictions enforce accelerated rent clauses in
commercial leases like the contractual remedy in paragraph 22 of the Lease in the present
case. See, e.g., Westfield Franklin Park Mall LLC v. Vanity Shop of Grand Forks, Inc.,
642 F.Supp.2d 756, 757 (N.D.Ohio 2008); Ona! v. BP Amoco Corp., 275 F.Supp.2d 650
(E.D.Pa. 2003); W & Ci Seaford Assocs. v. Eastern Shore Mkts., 714 F.Supp. 1336, 134649 (D.Del.1989); Cummings Properties, LLC v. Nat '1 Communications Corp., 869
N.E.2d 617, 620-622 (Mass. 2007); Aurora Business Park Associates. L.P. v. lvfichael
Albert, Inc., 548 N.W.2d 153 (Iowa 1996); FifiyStates Mgmt. Corp. v. Pioneer Auto
Parks. Inc .. 389 N.E.2d 113 (N.Y. 1979) (enforcing acceleration ofremaining monthly

rent due under 20-year lease).
Most of the courts analyzing these accelerated rent clauses determine whether the
remedy is an enforceable liquidated damage clause or an unenforceable penalty. In
Cummings Properties, LLC v. Nat '1 Communications Corp., 869 N.E.2d 617, 620-622

(Mass. 2007), the court explained as follows:
It is well settled that a contract provision clearly and reasonably
establishing liquidated damages should be enforced so long as it is not so
disproportionate to anticipated damages as to constitute a penalty ....
While any reasonable doubt whether a provision constitutes a valid
liquidated damages clause is to be resolved in favor of the aggrieved paiiy,
the party challenging it bears the burden of establishing that the damages
to which it agreed are disproportionate to a reasonable estimate of those
actual damages likely to result from a breach.
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See also W & G Seaford Assocs. v. Eastern Shore Mkts., 714 F.Supp. 1336, 1346-49

(D.Del.1989); JMD Holding Corp. v. Congress Fin. Corp., 828 N.E.2d 604 (N.Y. 2005):
Aurora Business Park Associates, L.P. v ..Michael Albert, Inc., 548 N.W.2d 153 (Iowa

1996).
Only in the most limited circumstances will an accelerated rent clause be held
unenforceable. One court explained as follows:
Thus, i11 rare cases, agreements providing for the acceleration of
the entire debt upon the default of the obligor may be circumscribed or
denied enforcement by utilization of equitable principles. In the vast
majority of instances, however, these clauses have been enforced at law in
accordance with their terms. Absent some element offraud, exploitive
overreaching or unconscionable conduct on the part of the landlord to
exploit a technical breach, there is no warrant, either in law or equity,
for a court to refuse enforcement of the agreement of the parties.
Fifty S'tates Mgmt. Corp. v. Pioneer Auto Parks. Inc., 389 N.E.2d 113, 116 (N.Y.

1979) (emphasis added).
Coming back to Idaho law, an enforceable liquidated damage provision must
satisfy two requirements. "First, an accurate determination of the actual damages that
might be incurred upon breach must be difficult or impossible to determine. Second, the
amount of the liquidated damages must bear a reasonable relationship to the actual
damages anticipated to be incurred." Margaret H Wayne Trust v. Lipsky, 123 Idaho 253,
258-259 (1993) (reversing a trial comi's refusal to enforce a liquidated damage clause).
Here. this court should enforce the accelerated rent clause in paragraph 22 of the
Lease as an enforceable liquidated damage provision. In Paragraph 22, Stonns and
Burggraf agreed in the event of their breach of the Lease, \Vatkins had the right to
recover unpaid past rent. the rent due until a court award, and the "unpaid rent for the
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balance of the term after the time of award" minus "the amount of such rental loss that
Lessee [i.e., Storms and Burggraf] proves could be reasonably avoided." 11 In other
words, Storms and Burggraf agreed to acceleration of all rents due for the balance of the
Lease, minus the amount of rent they proved could be reasonably avoided.
Importantly, Storms and Burggraf offered no evidence of the amount of future
rent that could be reasonably avoided. Thus, Storms and Burggraf failed to establish any
proof to justify an adjustment to the amount of future rent they owe under the Lease.
By seeking to enforce the acceleration clause, Watkins seeks nothing more than
the benefit of its bargain under the Lease. Paragraph 22 requires payment of only the
base rents due through the rest of the lease term. By seeking acceleration of rents due,
Watkins should receive the amounts due under the Lease "without having to harass a
reluctant tenant as periodical payments become due." Pierce, supra. As the evidence at
trial clearly demonstrated, Storms is a very "reluctant" tenant. He refused to pay the
percentage rent and provide the monthly sales reports both before and after this court
ruled as a matter of law that he owed the percentage rent. Storms withheld partial-and
then entire-monthly rent payments because his customers could not cross a bridge he
admitted was unsafe, even though his customers could still access his business by two
o1.her vehicular bridges, one pedestrian bridge, and the street in front of the Brownstone.
Watkins has attempted for several years to receive the rent to which it is entitled.
Enforcing paragraph 22 simply ensures Storms and Burggraf s obligation to pay the rent
without further action.

11

See~ 22 of Plaintiffs Exhibit 1. See also~ 22 of Defendants' Exhibit "A" admitted for the limited
purpose of providing any language rendered unreadable by the hole punches in Plaintiffs Exhibit 1.
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By enforcing paragraph 22, this court will be enforcing a valid liquidated damage
provision w1der Idaho law. See Margaret H. Wayne Trust v. Lipsky, supra. An accurate
determination of Watkins' actual damages is difficult or impossible to determine because
the Lease entitles Watkins to the greater of the base rent or 5% of the gross sales. In
recent years, the percentage rent has been greater than the base rent, but not every month
and not by the same amount. 12 To calculate the exact amount of base rent or percentage
rent due each month over the next 17 years would be difficult or impossible. However,
the amount of Watkins" remedy under paragraph 22 does bear a reasonable relationship
to the actual damages Watkins will incur because paragraph 22 is based on the actual
base rent, which is the minimum rental amount due for the balance of the lease term.
As a matter of law, any reasonable doubt whether paragraph 22 constitutes a valid
liquidated damage clause is to be resolved in favor of Watkins. Cummings Properties,

LLC, supra. Storms and Burggraf offered no evidence at trial of any "fraud, exploitive
overreaching or unconscionable conduct" by Watkins that could justify any equitable
limitation of paragraph 22. See F(fry States, supra.
B.

The Court Should Enter Judgment To Watkins On Count II In The
Amount Of $1,007,500.

In its original complaint, its amended complaint, and again at trial, Watkins
sought payment for all accelerated amounts due under paragraph 22 of the Lease.
Despite this repeated demand, Storms and Burggraf presented no evidence at trial of the
rental amount that Watkins could have reasonably avoided against future rents. As such,
this court should enforce paragraph 22 against Storms and Burggraf and enter judgment
to Watkins in the amount of $1,007,500 as shown in Plaintiffs Exhibit 37.

12

See Plaintiffs Exhibit 34.
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III.

THE COURT SHOULD ENTER JUDGMENT FOR WATKINS ON COUNT
THREE BECAUSE STORMS MATERIALLY BREACHED THE LEASE BY
FAILING TO PROVIDE MONTHLY SALES REPORTS AND REVOKING
THE POWER OF ATTORNEY.
Addendum A of the Lease requires that Storms and Burggraf provide monthly

sales reports for the Brownstone. 13 Storms admitted at trial that he did not provide
Watkins these reports. When Watkins tried to acquire these sales figures from the Idaho
State Tax Commission pursuant to the power of attorney language

111

Addendum A of the

Lease, Storms testified at trial that he revoked the power of attorney and instructed the
tax commission to not provide any more information to Watkins. Because Storms
refused to provide the monthly sales information to Watkins and then revoked the power
of attorney that purpo1ied to allow Watkins to request that information directly from the
tax commission, Storms breached the Lease. The damages resulting from this breach of
Count III are essentially the same percentage rent damages as outlined in Count I. As
such, the court should enter judgment against Storms and Burggraf for $21,888.
IV.

THE COURT SHOULD ENTER JUDGMENT FOR WATKINS ON COUNT
FOUR IN THE AMOUNT OF $4,000 BECAUSE STORMS IS RESPONSIBLE
FOR ROOF REPAIRS ON THE PREMISES.
Addendum B to the Lease provides for the maintenance responsibilities on the

Brownstone property identified as an "L" for the landlord's responsibility, or a "T" for
the tenant's responsibility. For roof repairs, the Lease provides "T¾." 14
A.

The Lease Reference To "T¾" For Roof Repair Responsibility Is
Ambiguous.

Idaho case law provides, "Under contract law, the determination that a document
is ambiguous is a question of law, but interpretation of that ambiguous term presents a

13
14

See Plaintiffs Exhibit 1.
See Plaintiffs Exhibit 1.
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question of fact. Such interpretations require a trier a fact to discern the intent of the
contracting parties, generally by considering the objective and purpose of the provision

and the circumstances surrounding the formation of the agreement." State v. Allen, 143
Idaho 267, 272 (Ct.App. 2006) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Further, in
interpreting ambiguous contract terms, "the district court may consider the objective and
purpose of the agreement and the conduct of the parties to the agreement." Bischo_[f v.
Quang-Watkins Properties, 113 Idaho 826,829 (Ct.App. 1987) (citations omitted)

(emphasis added).
The parties dispute the meaning of the "To/a" reference for roofrepair
responsibilities. Because the percentage in "To/a" is not defined, the Lease contains a
patent ambiguity.
B.

The Court Should Construe "To/a" To Mean That Storms and Burggraf Are
Responsible For Their Percentage Of The Entire Building.

Because "T%" is patently ambiguous, the court must determine the meaning of
"To/o" in light of the purpose of the provision, the circumstances surrounding the
formation, and the conduct of the parties. See Allen and Bischoff, supra.
Watkins testified that "To/a" referred to the tenant's portion of the bui ]ding vis-avis the entire building, which was approximately 58-60% of the whole building. Watkins
testified that this Lease was a triple net lease. The objective of a long-term triple net
lease is to places the uncertainty of future repairs on the tenant. Watkins was not willing
to pay for 50% of future roof repairs because the roof would likely need some repairs
before the end of the 30-year lease term. As such, Watkins emphatically testified that the
roof was the tenant's responsibility, that Addendum B did not say "L %" suggesting the
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roof repair was the landlord's responsibility, but "T%" demonstrating the repairs were the
tenant's responsibility. Watkins' testimony aligns with the objective of the provision.
On the other hand, Storms opined at trial that "T%" meant he was responsible for
only 50% of his portion of the building, which was approximately 60% of the entire
building. However, Storms' conduct undermines his interpretation. The record is
undisputed that he paid 100% of his share of first half of the first half of the roof repairs.
Briggs Roofing initially repaired one-half of the building's roof, which included about
20-30 feet of the Brownstone's po1iion of the building. Storms paid 100% of this portion
in the amount of $1,780. 15 Then, Storms paid an additional $5,500 for the repairs on the
remainder of the roof. 16 Watkins paid this entire $5,500 to Briggs for the roof 17 Thus,
the evidence at trial proved that Storms paid 100% of the roof repairs for the
Brownstone's portion of the building. Storms can point to no evidence at trial that
Watkins independently paid anything for roofrepairs.
Moreover, if "To/o" was meant to be 50% for Watkins and 50% for Storms of only
the Brownstone's portion of the building, then the pmiies could have easily defined the
roof repair responsibility as "TSO%" just as they did for the utility bill responsibility on
that same page. 18 However, in light of both parties' testimony that they were unsure of
the exact percentage of the Brownstone's portion of the entire building (i.e., somewhere
around 60%), a general reference to the tenant's percentage, or "T%," is a more
reasonable and likely more accurate construction of the ambiguous lease term.

15

See
See
17 See
18 See
16

Plaintiff's Exhibit 8.
Plaintiff's Exhibits 10 and 14.
Plaintiff's Exhibit 15.
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1.
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C.

Stonns Must Reimburse Watkins $4,000 For Roof Repairs.

Other than an amount paid by Watkins to Waters Construction, Storms has paid
l 00% of the roof repairs for the Brownstone's po11ion of the building. Watkins testified
that after problems v-.rith Briggs Roofing on the second half of the building, Waters
Construction came in and performed $4,000 worth of additional repairs to complete
Briggs· work on the roof. Although Storms argues that these repairs were not
"technically'· performed on the roof, both parties agree that but.for tlte problems with
Briggs Roofing, Waters Construction would not have performed a,iy repairs on the
building. The only reason Waters Construction ever came to the Brownstone was to
perform repairs from Briggs Roofing's defective roof work. Clearly, Waters
Construction's work on the building is properly categorized as a roof repair.
The undisputed evidence at trial showed that Watkins paid Waters Construction
$4,000 to date for the work on the roof repairs. t 9 Watkins seeks a judgment against
Storms and Burggraf for reimbursement of this amount.
V.

THE COURT SHOULD ENTER JUDGMENT FOR WATKINS ON COUNT
FIVE IN THE AMOUNT OF $8.450 BECAUSE STORMS WAS UNJUSTLY
ENRICHED AND FAILED TO PAY FOR THE UPSTAIRS STORAGE SPACE.
A.

Storms Is Liable For The Increased Rent From July 2008 Through July
2009.

Idaho Code Section 55-307(1) provides as follows:
In all leases of lands or tenements, or of any interest therein from
month to month, the landlord may, upon giving notice in writing at least
fifteen (15) days before the expiration of the month, change the terms of
the lease, to take effect at the expiration of the month. The notice, when
served upon the tenant, shal.l of itself operate and be effectual to create and
establish, as a part of the lease, the terms, rent and conditions specified in
the notice, if the tenant shall continue to hold the premises after the
expiration of the month.
19

See Plaintiffs Exhibit 16.
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Here, the evidence at trial showed that Watkins provided written notice to Storms
that it would no longer accept $100 per month as rent for the upstairs storage space. The
June 12, 2008 letter informed Storms that the new monthly rental amount would be
$750. 20 Storms continued to use the upstairs storage space from July 2008 through July
2009. Stonns continued to pay $100 per month during this time. However, as a matter of
law, he is responsible for the difference between the increased rent of $750 and the $100
per month that he paid. Thus, as a matter of law applied to the undisputed facts, Storms
is liable for $650 per month for 13 months, or $8,450.

B.

In The Alternative, St01111s Has Been Unjustly Enriched By Continuing To
Use The Upstairs Storage Space.

"A prima facie case of unjust enrichment consists of three elements: ( 1) there was
a benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff; (2) appreciation by the defendant
of such benefit; and (3) acceptance of the benefit w1der circumstances that would be
inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without payment to the plaintiff for the
value thereof." Vanderf()rd Co., Inc. v. Knudson, 144 Idaho 547, 558 (2007) (citation
omitted).
Clearly, Watkins conferred a benefit on Storms by allowing him to use the
upstairs storage space that was not part of the Lease. Storms appreciated this benefit
because he stored dry goods and other property in the upstairs storage space, which is
located immediately adjacent to the Brownstone restaurant. For Storms to enjoy this
benefit without paying Watkins for the reasonable value of that space would be
inequitable. Payment of $100 per month is not reasonable as the value to Storms. The
comi should enter judgment against Storms for $8,450.
20

See Plaintiffs Exhibit 26.
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VI.

THE COURT SHOULD ENTER JUDGMENT FOR WATKINS ON COUNT
SIX IN THE AMOUNT OF $3,400 BECAUSE STORMS WAS UNJUSTLY
ENRICHED AND FAILED TO PAY FOR THE COOLER STORAGE AT THE
"PIPEYARD."
"A prima facie case of unjust enrichment consists of three elements: (1) there was

a benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff; (2) appreciation by the defendant
of such benefit; and (3) acceptance of the benefit under circumstances that would be
inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without payment to the plaintiff for the
value thereof." Vanderford Co., Inc. v. Knudson, 144 Idaho 547, 558 (2007) (citation
omitted).
There is no dispute that Storms stored a large, walk-in cooler at the "pipeyard," an
outdoor storage area owed by Watkins and not included in the Lease, from approximately
October 2006 through July 2009. Watkins testified Storms agreed to pay $100 per month
for this space. Storms denies there was any agreement. However, even assuming there
was no agreement (which this could nonetheless find), the evidence is clear that Watkins
conferred the benefit of using the "pipeyard" storage on Storms. Storms appreciated the
benefit by keeping his cooler there for approximately 2 ½ years. To allow Storms to
retain the benefit without payment to Watkins would be inequitable. Watkins testified
that another business, Floral Arts, paid $100 per month for a similar area in the
"pipeyard." Watkins' business purpose is to rent property. Storms' testimony that
Watkins would let him store his cooler for 2 ½ years for free is not credible in light of
Watkins' business purpose and Storms' payments for rent on the Brownstone and the
upstairs storage area. As such, this court should find value of Storms' storage of the
cooler at the "pipeyard" at $100 per month for the 34 months. Accordingly, the court
should enter judgment against Storms for $3,400.
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VII.

THE COURT SHOULD ENTER JUDGMENT FOR WATKINS ON COUNT
SEVEN IN THE AMOUNT OF $6,800 BECAUSE STORMS WAS UNJUSTLY
ENRICHED AND FAILED TO PAY FOR THE SPACE #16 STORAGE.
"A prima facie case of unjust enrichment consists of three elements: (1) there was

a benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff; (2) appreciation by the defendant
of such benefit; and (3) acceptance of the benefit under circumstances that would be
inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without payment to the plaintiff for the
value thereof." Vande1ford Co., Inc. v. Knudson, 144 Idaho 547, 558 (2007) (citation
omitted).
Like the upstairs storage space, the Space # 16 storage is likewise not part of the
lease. The Lease refers to Space #16 separately from the leased premises and grants
Storms only a right of first refusal to this area. 21 While there was no evidence Storms
ever exercised this right, the evidence did show that Storms used part of Space #16 for
years, and all of Space # 16 since approximately October 2006, at which time Storms
changed the locks to access this area. Storms admitted that Space # 16 is not technically

part of the Lease, but he used it for years without paying anything for it. Watkins seeks
$200 per month for Storms' use of this area for the 34 months from October 2006
through July 2009, or $6,800, for the time Watkins was unable to use any portion of
Space #16. The court should enter judgment accordingly.
II

II
II
II

21

See 18 of Addendum Din Plaintiffs Exhibit I.
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VIII.

THE COURT SHOULD ENTER JUDGMENT FOR WATKINS ON COUNT
EIGHT IN THE AMOUNT OF $21,000 BECAUSE STORMS WAS
UNJUSTLY ENRICHED AND FAILED TO PAY FOR USE OF THE
SIDEWALK AS AN OUTDOOR DINING AREA.
Addendum B of the Lease states, "Tenant has permission to have an outside deck

which will not decrease or interfere with Blue Shield and Hansen Marketing parking.
Lessor will approve the design and size of the deck and must meet all city codes." 22
The parties dispute the meaning of the phrase "outside deck." To ensure the
"outside deck" wouldn't interfere with Blue Shield and Hansen Marketing parking, which
was located immediately to the north of the Brownstone, Watkins testified that the parties
understood that Storms would construct the "outside deck" off from the second floor loft
in the Brownstone on the north side of the building. This was the whole purpose of
including the reference to Blue Shield and Hansen Marketing parking in the Lease in the
first place. Storms tried to dispute this, testifying at trial that he specifically remembered
talking to Watkins about using the sidewalk area as the "outside deck." However, upon
cross-examination, Storms conceded that he previously testified at deposition that he
never talked to Watkins about using the sidewalk for outdoor dining. Thus, Storms'
testimony at trial that the parties discussed using the sidewalk as an outdoor dining area
before they signed the Lease is not credible.
"A prima facie case of unjust enrichment consists of three elements: (1) there was
a benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff; (2) appreciation by the defendant
of such benefit; and (3) acceptance of the benefit under circumstances that would be
inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without payment to the plaintiff for the

22

See ii 4 of Addendum B of Plaintiffs Exhibit 1.
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value thereof." Vande,ford Co., Inc. v. Knudson, 144 Idaho 547, 558 (2007) (citation
omitted).
The parties agree that the sidewalk is not in the city's right-of-way, but is private
property owned by Watkins. Watkins testified that the "outside deck" is a wooden
structure built up off the ground off the north side of the second floor loft of the
Brownstone. St01ms testified that an "outside deck" was any area customers could sit.
Again, "In construing a written instrument, this Court must consider it as a whole
and give meaning to all provisions of the writing to the extent possible." Selkirk Seed Co.
v. State Ins. Fund, 135 Idaho 434, 437 (2000). Further, "as between two permissible

constructions, that which establishes a valid contract is preferred to one which does not,
since it is reasonable to suppose that the parties meant something by their agreement, and
were not engaged in an attempt to do a vain and meaningless thing.,, A1organ v.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 68 Idaho 506,519 (1948). In this regard, Storms'

interpretation is not reasonable because it does not account for the language requiring
Watkins' approval of the design and size of the deck, or the language referring to the area
by the Blue Shield and Hansen Marketing parking. Storms' interpretation renders the
Lease language "vain and meaningless." Morgan, supra.
Even if "outside deck" included the sidewalk area as Storms proposes, the
undisputed evidence at trial established that Storms never submitted any plans for
Watkins' approval. Watkins should have the right to enforce the Lease. Storms would
argue that Watkins knew of the sidewalk dining and thus acquiesced to the use.
However, Watkins is not estopped from enforcing the Lease as written unless Storms'
reliance on Watkins' silence would create a "substantial economic detriment." Grover v.
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Wadsworth, 147 Idaho 60, 64 (2009). Here, Storms provided no evidence of a

"substantial economic detriment" that would result if he had to comply with the lease
terms he agreed to in the first place.
Had Storms submitted plans and obtained Watkins's approval for a deck, and then
built the deck according to the approved specifications, Watkins would have no right to
additional payment. l-Iowever, because Storms chose to ignore the Lease requirements
regarding the outside deck and instead simply started using the sidewalk area for outdoor
dining, to allow him to use Watkins' sidewalk area without payment would be
inequitable. Watkins seeks $500 per month for the use of this sidewalk area during the
seven summer months of April to October each year from 2004 through 2009, for a total
of $21,000.
IX.

THE COURT SHOULD ENTER JUDGMENT FOR WATKINS ON COUNT
NINE AND EVICT STORMS AND BURGGRAF FROM THE PREMISES
AND THE SIDEWALK AREA.
Paragraph 22 of the Lease providing Watkins' remedies upon the lessees' default

states, "Nothing contained herein shall be deemed to limit any other rights or remedies
which Lessor may have."
Idaho Code Section 6-303, et seq., provides for the remedy of eviction. If a tenant
fails to pay rent, the landlord is entitled to restitution of the premises. Brooks v.
Coppedge, 71 Idaho 166, 170 (1951). In such a case, the lease is not terminated until

after entry of a judgment to that effect. Id. 71 Idaho at 171.
Clearly, Storms and Burggraf have materially breached the Lease. As such,
Watkins has the legal right to an order evicting Storms and Burggraf from the property.
Because Storms and Burggraf have no right to possession of the sidewalk area, the order
to evict Storms and Burggraf should include the sidewalk as well.
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Watkins testified at trial that it wished things were different and that it doesn't
want to put anybody out of business, but Watkins cannot continue its relationship with
Storms under the present circumstances. Clearly, Watkins has the right to an eviction
order.
X.

THE COURT SHOULD ENTER JUDGMENT FOR WATKINS ON COUNT
TEN BECAUSE STORMS FAILED TO PAY THE FOOD AND DRINK
CREDIT.
Addenda A and D of the Lease provide that Watkins shall receive a $250 per

month food and drink credit from Storms and Burggraf. However, the parties agreed that
they did not handle the food and drink credit as writlen in the Lease. Rather, Storms
provided Watkins with 12 months of food and drink credit in December of each year in
the total annual amount of $3,000. Then Watkins had 12 months before the credit would
expire. Both Watkins and Storms agreed that Storms and Burggraf had not provided the
credit since December 2007, which credits expired in December 2008. This credit is
based on the $250 per month value to Watkins, not the actual cost to Storms and
Burggraf. As such, Storms and Burggraf owe a $3,000 credit from December 2008, and
another $3,000 credit from December 2009, for a total of $6,000.
XI.

DEFENDANTS' AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES DO NOT CHANGE THE
RESULT OF THE JUDGMENT SOUGHT IN THIS CASE.
In their amended answer to amended complaint, Storms and Burggraf raise a

number of affirmative defenses. 23 However, none of these affirmative defenses alter the
judgment that Watkins seeks in this case.
As to their First Affirmative Defense, Storms and Burggraf failed to present any
evidence that Watkins has failed to mitigate its damages.
23

See pp. 2-3 of Defendants' Amended Answer to Plaintifrs Amended Complaint dated November 17,
2009, already on file with the cotni.
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As to their Second Affirmative Defense, the court previously ruled at summary
judgment that the five-year statute of limitations applied to Watkins' claims in this action.
However, Watkins conformed its evidence at trial to the court's ruling and does not seek
damages accruing before November 2003. As such, this defense does not affect the
judgment Watkins seeks herein.
As to their Third Affirmative Defense, Storms and Burggraf presented no
evidence to justify application of the doctrine oflaches. The Idaho Supreme Court
explained the doctrine of laches as follows:
The defense of laches is a creation of equity and is a specie of
equitable estoppel. Whether a party is guilty of laches primarily is a
question of fact and therefore its determination is within the province of
the trial court. The decision to apply laches is committed to the sound
discretion of the trial court. Because application of laches is discretionary,
the standard of review on appeal is whether the trial court properly found
( l) a lack of diligence by the party against whom the defense is asserted,
and (2) prejudice to the party asserting the defense. As a corollary, the
denial of a defense of laches by the trial court will be upheld in the
absence of an abuse of discretion.
Sword v. Sweet, 140 Idaho 242, 249 (2004) (citation omitted). Here, Storms and

Burggraf presented no evidence of a lack of diligence by Watkins in prosecuting its
claims other than the application of the statute of limitations, which has already been
applied. More importantly, Storms and Burggraf presented no evidence of any prejudice
to them resulting from the timing of Watkins' claims. As such, this affirmative defense
does not affect the judgment Watkins seeks.
As to their Fourth Affirmative Defense, although temporarily raised as a defense
at summary judgment, Storms and Burggraf abandoned their defense of contract
modification by course of conduct. The court previously noted this abandonment. 24

24

See p. 2 of the Order dated January 20, 2010, already on file with the court.
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As for their Fifth Affirmative Defense, Watkins discussed accord and satisfaction
above and explained why Storms and Burggraf do not prevail on this defense.
As for their Sixth Affirmative Defense, Storms and Burggraf presented no
evidence to support the doctrine of resjudicata against any of Watkins' claims.
Apparently, Storms and Burggraf intended to assert this defense against Watkins' claim
for roof repair damages. However, Storms and Burggraf presented no evidence of an
action between Watkins and Storms on Watkins' present claim for roofrepairs. See

Kootenai Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. Lamar Corp., 148 Idaho 116, --- (2009). The only
evidence tangentially related to resjudicata involved Waters Construction's lawsuit
against Stonns and Watkins for payment for Waters' work. There was no evidence that
the Waters lawsuit involved any claim by Watkins against Storms that resulted in a final
judgment. As such, resjudicata does not affect the judgment Watkins seeks herein.
As for any other defenses Storms and Burggraf may raise in their closing brief,
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) provides that certain, enumerated defenses shall be
made by motion. Otherwise, "Eve,y defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim, shall be
asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required ... " I.R.C.P. 12(b)
(emphasis added). Storms and Burggraf cannot at this late stage raise any other
affirmative defense not previously plead.
XII.

CONCLUSION.
Based on the foregoing, the court should enter a money judgment for Watkins

against Storms in the amount of $1,086,138, itemized as follows:
Percentage Rent ............................................. $21,888
Late Fees .......................................................... $7, 100
Food & Drink Credit ........................................ $6,000
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Roof Repairs .................................................... $4,000
Accelerated Rent ....................................... $1,007,500
Upstairs Storage ............................................... $8,450
"Pipeyard" Storage ........................................... $3,400
Space #16 Storage ............................................ $6,800
Outdoor Dining .............................................. $21,000
TOTAL
$1,086,138
Fmiher, the court should enter a money judgment for Watkins against Burggraf in
the amount of $1,046,488, itemized as follows:
Percentage Rent ............................................. $21,888
Late Fees .......................................................... $7,100
Food & Drink Credit.. ...................................... $6,000
Roof Repairs .................................................... $4,000
Accelerated Rent ....................................... $1,007,500
TOTAL
$1,046,488
Additionally, the court should enter a judgment in favor of Watkins ordering
Storms and Burggraf evicted from the premises and restoring possession of the leased
premises to Watkins. This order should also prohibit Storms from continuing to use
Watkins' sidewalk for outdoor dining purposes.
In the event the court does not enter a judgment for restitution of the premises and
the defendants otherwise retain possession of the premises, the comi should enter an
order requiring Storms and Burggraf to specifically perform their contractual duty to
provide Watkins with the monthly sales for the previously month "by the 10 th of each
month" pursuant to Addendum A of the Lease. Further, the court should enter a
judgment requiring Storms and Burggraf and to provide Watkins with a power of
attorney acceptable to the Idaho State Tax Commission to allow Watkins "to check sales
figures" submitted by Storms and Burggraf for the business operated on the lease
premises.
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Watkins reserves the right to raise the post-judgment issues of pre-judgment
interest, post-judgment interest, costs, and attorney's fees until such time as the comi
enters its judgment herein.
DATED this ~ day of February, 2010.
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES PLLC

,/cL#
'

By

~ J Driscoll

Attorneys for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ;)c2_ day of February, 2010, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFF'S CLOSING BRIEF to be served, by
placing the same in a sealed envelope and depositing in the United States Mail, postage
prepaid, or hand delivery, facsimile transmission or overnight delivery, addressed to the
following:
/

Michael J. Whyte, Esq.
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW
OFFICES, PLLC
2635 Channing Way
Idaho Falls, ID 83404

[ ])J~ Mail

[ VJ
[
[

Fax
] Overnight Delivery
] Hand Delivery
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUD\<;:,IAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COU1\JT\UOFltt:lNjNlp'7,l1:s-f
THE WATKINS COMPANY, LLC, an Idaho
limited liability company,
Case No. CV-08-7258
Plaintiff,

ORDER ON SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING

V.

MICHAEL STORMS and KA THY
BURGGRAF,
Defendants.

In the course of the bench trial in this matter, the Court requested supplemental
briefing on Plaintiff's claim for accelerated rent based upon an alleged breach of the
Lease Agreement.

At the conclusion of the trial, the Court allowed the Paiiies until

February 22, 2010 to submit briefing on this issue. The Court received the Paiiies'
supplemental briefing although Plaintiff's brief was not limited to the foregoing issue.
Defendants have accordingly requested leave to supplement its brief to address all issues.
A hearing on this matter is not necessary.
The record is not clear that supplemental briefing was to be limited to the
accelerated rent issue, although that was the Court's anticipation.

Accordingly,

Defendants' motion is granted. Defendants shall have ten days to supplement its brief to
include briefing on all issues.
Dated this

_2:_ 1....,( day of February, 2010.

ORDER ON SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING(., ,. n
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this sztiday of February, 2010, I did send a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document upon the parties listed below by mailing, with the
correct postage thereon; by causing the same to be placed in the respective courthouse
mailbox: or by causing the same to be hand-delivered.

BJ. Driscoll
SMTTH DRISCOLL &
ASSOC TA TES. PLLC
P.O. Box 50731
Idaho Falls. ID 83405
Michael J. Whyte
THOMSEN STEPHENS
LAW OFFICES. PLLC
2635 Channing Way
Idaho Falls, ID 83404
RONALD LONGMORE
Clerk of the District Court
Bonneville County, ldaho

)1~

By- - ~ ~ - - - - ~ - ~ - - -

Deputy Clerk

ORDER ON SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING

/.,n.u .'J.
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Michael J. Whyte, Esq., ISB #4645
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC
2635 Channing Way
Idaho Falls ID 83404
Telephone (208)522-1230
Fax (208)522-1277
Attorney for Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BUNJ\IEVILLE
THE WATKINS COMP ANY, LLC,
an Idaho limited liability company,
Plaintiff,
V.

MICHAEL STORMS and KA THY
BURGGRAF,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-08-7258

SUPPLEMENTAL CLOSING BRIEF

COMES NOW Defendants, by and through their attorney or record, and submits this
Supplemental Closing Brief.

I. COUNT ONE
BREACH OF WRITTEN LEASE CONTRACT - FAIL URE TO PAY AMOUNTS DUE
In Count One, Plaintiff seeks additional rent based on the gross sales from the
Brownstone restaurant. There is no dispute that as of the date of trial, defendants had paid all the
base rent under the lease agreement. As was born out through pretrial motions, and the trial
testimony, defendant did not believe that he was required to pay any additional amount based on

1-

SUPPLEMENTAL CLOSING BRIEF

r· , I

1

t:,, ~) '".t

the Brownstone's gross sales beginning in 2007. However, approximately one month prior to the
trial the Court ruled that this clause stating that the amount of the base rent could be increased up
to 5% of the gross sales applies the entire term of the contract. Plaintiffs originally sought
$28,988.00 in their complaint. Through the testimony and Exhibit 34 it was clear that defendants
had paid some additional rent to be applied toward this percentage rent. The Plaintiff agreed
these additional amounts should be applied with the exception of an additional $967.00 as
evidence by defendants' Exhibits I and J. Exhibit I shows the base rent owed for September of
2007 in the amount of $2,683.00, and actual payment of $3,258.00. Exhibit J shows an is
defendants' check stub indicating an additional $392.00 was paid to plaintiff. The notation on
the check stub indicated the payment was for "rent." Plaintiff argues this additional amount was
for unpaid property taxes. However, plaintiff further testified property taxes for that year would
have been due in June. Plaintiff did not provide other evidence or documentation supporting
plaintiff's "belief' that the additional $967.00 paid by defendants was for property taxes which
would have been due several months earlier. The only clear undisputed evidence comes from
defendant Storms' testimony and Exhibits I and J. Therefor this additional amount should apply
as a credit for defendants.
Plaintiff wants the Court to find his testimony and believe as more accurate because of his
claim that defendants never paid the percentage of rent due. However, in reviewing Exhibit 34 it
is clear that Defendants paid some amount for percentage rent more often than not. Exhibit 34
shows a total of 76 months. Of those, there were 30 months wherein additional rent was owed
based on the Brownstone sales proceeds. Exhibit 34 further shows that defendants paid
additional rent to Plaintiff in 26 months. Although the amount paid was not all that was owed to
2-
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plaintiff under this exhibit, it is clearly not true that defendants never paid any portion of this
additional rent.
The amounts sought by plaintiff should further be offset by the accord and satisfaction
reached by the parties in September of 2008. Exhibits_ f~ and Jj_ are two separate Three Day
Notice to Pay Rent or Quit the Premises prepared by plaintiff and delivered on defendants. At
the time they were created, plaintiff had already made demand on defendant for payment of
numerous items as outlined in a June 2008 letter (Exhibit 26). Plaintiff testified that he was
aware of the demands made in the June letter. Plaintiff further testified that he was aware that
there was no language in the exhibits outlining the underlying basis for the amount sought and
that the language of Exhibits 1!__ and~ stated that if defendant paid the amounts requested that
he would be in compliance with the lease. Defendant Storms also testified that he was aware
plaintiff was seeking amount for unpaid rent and other claims through Exhibit 26 at the time he
was served with Exhibit I_[ and j_J_. With this information, he paid the amounts plaintiff sought
in order to remove the question of his compliance with the lease and to take advantage of
plaintiffs offered compromise. Idaho Code §28-3-310 addresses what is necessary for an accord
and satisfaction. This statute states:
(1)
If a person against whom a claim is asserted proves that (I) that person in
good faith tendered an instrument to the claimant as full satisfaction of the claim,
(ii) the amount of the claim was unliquidated or subject to a bona fide dispute, and
(iii) the claimant obtained payment of the instrument, the following subsections
apply.

(2)
Unless subsection (3) of this section applies, the claim is discharged if the
person against whom the claim is asserted proves that the instrument or an
accompanying written communication contained a conspicuous statement to the
effect that the instrument was tendered as full satisfaction of the claim.
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Idaho Code §28-3-310.
Plaintiff created the written communication offering a compromise of a disputed claim
with defendants. The three-day notices clearly state an amount plaintiff would accept from
defendants in order for defendants to be in compliance with the lease. The simple definition of
compliance is to be in conformity with the requirements. In this case, in conformity with the
requirements under the lease and the other issues outlined in Exhibit 26. Plaintiff did not offer
another definition of "compliance" in the Notices. The conspicuous language in the Notices,
created by plaintiff, was accepted by defendants when payment was made. There was no
language restricting this offer of compromise except for the length of time the offer was open.
When defendant made this payment within the time specified, an accord and satisfaction took
place. "To establish an accord and satisfaction the parties accepting a new or different obligation
must do so knowingly and intentionally". Harris v. Wildcat Corp.,97 Idaho 884, 886, 556 P.2d
67, 69 (1976). However, "an accord and satisfaction may be implied from the attendant
circumstances". Id.
Plaintiff testified that these Notices could not cover any other issue or payment other than
rent because the statute only allows a claim for unpaid rent. However, this is not accurate. Idaho
Code § 6-303(2) outlines the process where a landlord can issue a written three day notice to a
tenant when the tenant is in default of paying the rent. Idaho Code§ 6-303(3) allows the same
recourse for a landlord when the tenant has failed to perform other conditions of the lease or
agreement under which the property is held other than a payment for rent. The statute further
allows that if the tenant pays the amount within three days the lease is saved from forfeiture.
Where a lease agreement contains a definitive contractual right to terminate the lease upon
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default of the lessee, the lessor has a choice of pursuing either its contractual or statutory remedy.
Riverside Development Company v. Ritchie, 103 ID 515,650 P.2d 657 (1982). Plaintiff was

aware of the amounts sought prior to the Notices, including additional monies for the following:
additional rent; roof repairs; use of the upstairs storage unit; storage of a cooler; use of "space
#16"; use of the outdoor sidewalk area; and food and drink gift cards. Defendant relied to his
detriment on these Three Day Notices and acted on plaintiffs statements regarding the amounts
which plaintiff was seeking and that if those amounts were paid defendants would be in
compliance with the lease.

If the Notices do not include anything other than rent, than at a minimum, defendant was
in compliance with the amount of rent owed as of September 2008. Plaintiff testified that he did
not include any language into the Notices to qualify the "rent" sought. The lease defines rent as
either the base rent or a percentage of gross sales. Both plaintiff and defendant knew this at the
time of the Notices. The language of the Notices is not ambiguous and the logical interpretation
to apply is that the "rent" sought in the Notices was both base rent and percentage rent. Plaintiff
should not now be allowed to add a definition. Therefore, plaintiff offered a compromise to
defendant that was accepted by defendant and as of September 2008 defendant was in
compliance with the lease.

II.
LATE FEES

Plaintiff made a claim for additional late fees because defendants failed to timely pay
rent. Both plaintiff and defendant testified that the lease, Exhibit 1, does not contain an actual
date when the rent is due. Plaintiff tried to propound that "normal" lease would be due on the
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first; however continued to admit that this particular lease has no specific day of the month when
the lease is due. No proof or evidence was provided that the lease was due on the first as plaintiff
claims. All witnesses testified that the course of conduct throughout the entire lease tenn (since
1997) was to pay the rent after the City of Idaho Falls furnished the utility statement. The
evidence showed that defendants paid the rent upon receipt of the utility statement so that a
subtraction of plaintiffs share of the utilities could be made. "Unless otherwise agreed, periodic
rent is payable the beginning of any term of one month or less and otherwise in equal monthly
installments at the beginning of each month." (Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act§
1.401 (c).) "The rent is due on the date either expressly made or to be gathered by necessary
implication from the acts and circumstances of the parties or by custom or usage in the
community." 49 Am.Jur.2d Landlord and Tenant§ 555. Because the commercial lease lacks a
specific due date, the historical practice controls when the rent is due. The evidence showed that
the agreement of the parties and the acts and circumstances of the parties was to pay the rent after
the utility statement was received.
If, on the other hand, the Court detem1ines that the first day of the month was the

intended date when rent was due, then the parties actually modified the lease through their course
of conduct for the first 12 years by waiting until the utility statement was received from the City.
"Consent to a modification of a prior written contract may be implied from a course of conduct
consistent with the asserted modification. Ore-Ida Potato Products, Inc. v. Larsen, supra at 296,
362 P.2d 384.
Under either situation, plaintiff failed to prove it's claim that the defendant paid rent late
which would trigger the late fees charge.
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III.
COUNT TWO
BREACH OF WRITTEN LEASE CONTRACT - ACCELERATION

Defendants, previously provided their argument regarding the acceleration of lease clause
and therefor will not provide any additional argument.

IV. COUNT THREE
BREACH OF WRITTEN LEASE CONTRACT - FAIL URE TO PROVIDE MONTHLY
SALES REPORTS
At the trial defendants confinned that they did not supply the monthly sales reports to
Plaintiff. However, Addendum "A" to the lease stated that the lease was a power of attorney to
allow plaintiff to obtain the sales reports from the State of Idaho. Plaintiff testified that he used
the lease to obtain sales reports prior to filing the lawsuit. Defendants further testified that
plaintiff never asked for the sales reports. Therefore the logical presumptions was that the
plaintiff was obtaining those reports from the State of Idaho. The purpose of the power of
attorney was for plaintiff to obtain the reports. Although defendants did not provide the reports,
plaintiff was obtaining the reports thereby accomplishing the same effect.

V. COUNTFOUR
BREACH OF WRITTEN LEASE CONTRACT- FAILURE TO PAY ROOF REPAIRS
Plaintiffs amended complaint sought payment of $4, 500.00 as payment for roof repairs.
A.

Defendants paid the full amount for the roof repairs.

Plaintiff testified that defendant Storms paid $5,000.00 on December 23, 2005 and an
additional $500.00 on June 21, 2007 to plaintiff for the roof repairs. The history showed that
although defendant paid the $5,000.00 in 2005, plaintiff failed to pay the roof company until
June 22, 2007. During that period of time, plaintiff held defendants money and failed to pay his
7-
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obligation to the roofing company. Regardless, in June 2007 Briggs Roofing accepted $5,500.00
as payment for its services in fixing the roof. Testimony provided by all parties confirm that this
was the amount paid to plaintiff by defendant Stonns.
Plaintiffs amended complaint sought $4,500.00 for these repairs; however by the time
the matter went to trial the amount sought was $4,000.00. Under defendants' standing objection,
plaintiff testified that the additional $4,000.00 sought in this claim was not for roof repairs, but
was actually for walls and ceiling repairs. This was contrary to plaintiffs claim in its complaint.
Plaintiff wants to piggy-back these damages into it's roof repair claim; however, as indicated
through the testimony, all roof repairs were paid by Stonns and no additional amount for roof
repairs is owing to plaintiff or any third party.
B.

Defendants paid their percentage under the lease agreement.

If it is determined that not all amounts of the roofrepairs have been paid, defendants still

do not owe any additional amounts because defendants paid their portion under the lease
agreement. Addendum "B" to the lease only states that the maintenance and repairs of the roof
as "T %". Because this term is ambiguous, it is up to the trier of fact to determine the intent of
the parties by considering the objective and purpose of the provision and the circumstances
surrounding the formation of the agreement. State v. Alan, 143 Id.267, 272 (Ct. App. 2006). The
parties have differing interpretations for this term. Plaintiff testified that the T¾ referred to the
entire area covering the Brownstone Restaurant. Plaintiff did not testify that this interpretation
was actually discussed with defendants at the time the lease was entered into. However, both
Defendants testified that when they created the lease with plaintiff, the roof repair issue was
discussed and agreed that defendants would be responsible for only a percentage of the roof
8-
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covering the Brownstone Restaurant. Storms further testified that in his prior written lease with
Watkins when he and other family members were operating the business known as the "Quilted
Bear", there was similar language in that lease and a similar agreement that both plaintiff and
Storms were each responsible for a portion of the roof covering that Quilted Bear business.
Prior to the roof issues which are the subject of this litigation, there were no other
maintenance or repairs to the roof to provide guidance as to this interpretation. Plaintiff wants to
defendants to be 100% responsible for all roofrepairs. However, the acts of the parties with
respect to these repairs suggests otherwise. Plaintiff testified that he chose and contracted with
Briggs Roofing to provide the repairs. Storms testified that he had no discussion or input with
plaintiff about who to hire for these repairs and was unaware that plaintiff had hired Briggs to
perform any roofrepairs until Briggs' workers began working. Storms testified that no repair
bills were sent to him and he was only aware of the costs incurred when plaintiff would request
money from Storms. Plaintiff and Storms both testified that all of defendants' payments were
paid to plaintiff and that plaintiff held defendant's money for these repairs. When a final
settlement and compromise was reached in June 2007, and Storms agreed to pay an additional
$500.00 to have this matter resolved, again the final settlement payment was made to plaintiff
instead of paying Briggs Roofing directly. All of these actions are inconsistent with plaintiffs
position that he has no responsibility for any roof repairs. Plaintiff wants to claim no
responsibility for these roof repairs; however, Plaintiff controlled all circumstances involved with
the roof repairs after Storms advised him of the leaks: Plaintiff controlled the negotiations and
contract with the company hired to do the work; plaintiff received the billing statements for
repairs; plaintiff did not provide much, if any cost information to defendant while the repairs

9-

SUPPLEMENTAL CLOSU~G BRIEF

were being conducted; plaintiff required defendant to pay him instead of the repair company
directly; plaintiff retained defendants' money during the repairs instead of paying the repair
company or returning it to defendants; plaintiff eventually negotiated a settlement with the roof
company and paid the roof company that settlement amount. At no time did plaintiff tum any of
this responsibility over to defendants. If plaintiff truly had no responsibility for this roof and the
roof repairs, the more logical course of action would be for plaintiff to have no involvement with
this process and require defendant to hire the repair company, control the repair company's scope
of work, and pay the repair company directly. Because the exact opposite took place in that
Plaintiff controlled all aspects of this repair, it is more logical that Plaintiff has responsibility for
this roof and believed that at the time of these repairs, had responsibility for the payment of these
roof costs. In light of the circumstances and events surrounding the roof repair, the logical
interpretation this "T¾" language is to hold that plaintiff has equal responsibility for the roof
repair costs, that defendants have paid their share and that plaintiff should not recover for the
amount sought in his complaint.
If the interpretation of the language and the intent of the parties remains in doubt then the

language should be interpreted against the drafter of the document - plaintiff.
However, where the parties' mutual intent cannot be understood from the language
used, intent becomes a question for the trier of fact, to be ascertained in light of
extrinsic evidence. Luzar, 107 Idaho at 697, 692 P.2d at 341; USA Fertilizer, 120
Idaho at 273, 815 P .2d at 4 71. If, after applying the ordinary processes of
interpretation and considering the relevant extrinsic evidence, there remains doubt
as to the actual, mutual intent of the parties, then the ambiguity should be resolved
against the party who used the ambiguity in drafting the contract. Luzar, 107
Idaho at 697, 692 P.2d at 341; Werry v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 97 Idaho 130, 540
P.2d 792 (1975); Big Butte Ranch, Inc. v. Grasmick, 91 Idaho 6,415 P.2d 48
(1966); USA Fertilizer, 120 Idaho at 274,815 P.2d at 472; see also 3 CORBIN
ON CONTRACTS § 559 (1960).
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Farnsworth v. Dairymen's Creamery Ass 'n, 125 Idaho 866, 870, 876 P .2d 148, 152 (Ct. App.
1994).
Because plaintiff was the drafter of this lease any ambiguity remaining should be resolved
against plaintiff and therefore the plaintiff has equal responsibility for the maintenance and
repairs of this roof.
C.

Accord and Satisfaction.

In the alternative, defendants have further paid all amounts for the roof repairs through
the accord and satisfaction reached by the parties in September 2008. At the time of the three
day notices, the roof repairs were completed. Plaintiff had made demand that defendant pay the
repair costs in Exhibit 26. Idaho Code §6-303(3) allows a landlord to serve a three day notice of
eviction when a tenant has failed to perform conditions of the lease or agreement, other than
payment of the rent. The roofrepairs are part of the lease, but not included in the rent. Under
Idaho Code §6-303(3) plaintiff issued its three day notice to defendant which included a
compromise of the roof repair claims.
Additionally, Storms testified that this lease was not created by himself nor Kathy
Burggraf. It was presented by Plaintiff. Therefor the presumption is the Plaintiff created this
document. Because Plaintiff created this document, the interpretation should be in favor of
Defendant and against Plaintiff.
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VI. COUNT FIVE
BREACH OF THE ORAL LEASE CONTRACT BASED ON THE ARRANGEMENT OF
THE UPSTAIRS STORAGE
Plaintiff testified that the parties never had a agreement to rent the upstairs for $100.00
per month. However, this is contrary to the June 2008 letter (Exhibit 26) sent by plaintiffs
attorneys at plaintiffs direction, using plaintiffs infonnation, which specifically stated the
parties had an agreement to rent the upstairs for $100. 00 per month. Defendants continued to
pay, and plaintiff continued to accept the agreed upon $100.00 per month until such time as the
Court ended the tenancy of defendant. Defendant paid all amounts owing under this agreement
and therefor no additional amounts are due and owing.
Plaintiffs are not entitled to any additional rent for the upstairs based on the claim of
unjust enrichment. "A prima facie case of unjust enrichment consists of three elements: (1) There
was a benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff; (2) appreciation of such benefits;
and (3) acceptance of the benefit under the circumstances that would be inequitable for the
Defendant to retain the benefit without payment to the Plaintifffor value thereof" Vanderford

Co., Inc., v. Knudson, 144 Id. 547, 558 (2007) (emphasis added). There is no dispute that
defendants occupied this space by agreement of the parties. There is further no dispute that
plaintiffs receive payment of $100.00 per month from defendants for the use of this space. This
is the appropriate and accepted value of this space. Plaintiff was unable to prove the third
element of unjust enrichment in that defendants paid plaintiff for the value of the benefit.
Historically, the value of the property was $100.00 as agreed by the parties. Plaintiff did not
provide any evidence as to a value other than this $100.00 paid and accepted. Defendant was
unaware of the actual size of this property and could not testify as to its value. Plaintiff claims
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that $750.00 requested in Exhibit 26 is the actual value of the use of this property; however, this
has no independent verification or proof for this amount and said amount cannot be the actual
value when viewed in terms of the space and the lease overall. Both parties confirm that space
was used for storage and that the only access to this property is through the Brownstone kitchen
up a narrow stairway. In comparison to the rent paid for the Brownstone space, the $750.00
demanded for this storage space is an extremely over exaggerated value. There is no dispute that
the parties agreed the reasonable value for this space was $100.00 prior to this lawsuit. In
November 2007 there was a $625.00 increase in the base rent for the entire are occupied by the
Brownstone Restaurant including the kitchen, seating area, and office of approximately 5,000 sq.
ft. This equates to approximately 14% increase in base rent. On the other hand, Plaintiff seeks
an unreasonable $650.00 increase for small storage area which equates to more than a 700%
increase in claimed value. The reasonable value of the space is and was $100.00 and plaintiff
received this value for use of the space.

VII. COUNT SIX
UNJUST ENRICHMENT - COOLER STORAGE
It was agreed that Storms stored a walk-in cooler at plaintiffs "pipeyard" from

approximately October 2006 though July 2009. Defendant testified parties had no agreement for
payment for the use of the space, and plaintiff allowed defendant use of the space without
demanding payment until 2008. Therefore, the court should hold that the parties was to allow
Storms to store this as a gratuity given the previous business relationship.
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VIII. COUNT SEVEN
UNJUST ENRICHMENT - SPACE NO. 16 STORAGE
Plaintiff again seeks an unjust enrichment claim for the use of Space 16. In the amended
complaint, plaintiff alleges that defendants had been using Space 16 for approximately 34
months as of the day of the amended complaint (August 5, 2009). Trial testimony confirmed that
both plaintiff and defendant were using this storage area. No testimony was provided with
respect to the area of Space 16 nor the corresponding reasonable value of this space. Defendants
testified that the use of this Space was to be without compensation to plaintiff and according to
Exhibit 26, as of June 12, 2008, plaintiff also believed that defendant use of this space was a
courtesy, and that no rent was expected. It is clear that at that time, no rent was historically
expected and plaintiff can not now make a claim that rent is due for the use of this space.
Additionally, as with the upstairs space, plaintiff was unable to establish a value in order to
satisfy the elements of unjust enrichment.

IX. COUNT EIGHT
UNJUST ENRICHMENT - OUTDOOR DINNING AREA USE
The trial testimony was that the lease contains language in Addendum B allowing the use
of outdoor space by defendants:
4.
Tenant has permission to have an outside deck which will
not decrease or interfere with Blue Shield and Hansen Marketing
parking. Lessor will approve the design and size of the deck and
must meet all city codes.
For several years, during the warmer months, in accordance with the lease, without comment,
objection or complaint from plaintiff, defendants used an area outside the main entrance of the
restaurant to serve Brownstone customers. This area does not interfere with Blue Shield and
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Hansen Marketing parking. All parties provided their testimony regarding this clause in the lease
agreement. Both defendants testified that the use of the sidewalk was included in the definition
of "deck" in that all parties discussed using multiple places, including the sidewalk in front of the
restaurant. Plaintiff wants to narrow the use of the sidewalk space because he believes that a
"deck" is only a structure made from wood. However the general definition of "deck" includes a
flat floored roofless area adjoining a building. Therefore the use of the sidewalk is within the
scope of Addendum Band would be included in a reasonable definition of that clause.
If the interpretation of the parties' intent when it chose the term "deck" remains in doubt

and ambiguous, then this ambiguity should be resolved against the plaintiff as the drafter of the
lease. Farnsworth 125 Idaho at 870.
In the alternative, if the use of the sidewalk is not included in the definition of "deck", plaintiff is

still not entitled to additional compensation for this space because he is already receiving
compensation through the rent payments. Both plaintiff and defendant testified that the use of
the outside area allows defendant to serve more customers and to increase its monthly gross
sales. Under the rental payment clause, the defendant pays more in rent when its revenues
increase. Because the use of the outside area increases the sales and there is a corresponding
increase in the rent, plaintiff has already received compensation for the use of the outdoor space.
COUNT NINE
FOOD AND DRINK CREDIT

The addenda allows Watkins to receive $250.00 per month food and drink credit.
However, the testimony was that prior to 2007, defendants would provide a complete years worth
of food credit ($3,000.00) to plaintiff to his before the next calendar year expired. Plaintiff wants
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to claim that in the parties modified the lease so that the entire years worth of food credit should
be paid instead of paying each month. However, in other circumstances when the parties have
not complied with the specific language of the lease, including, but not limited to the specific
date when rent was due, plaintiff does not want the parties historical actions and application to
have any influence or control on the lease language. If the Court determines that Plaintiff is
entitled to food and drink credit, parties should be order to comply with the terms of the lease and
have those amounts turned over on a monthly basis in the amount of $250.00.
X. COUNTTEN
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE - LA CHES
Plaintiff testified that he was damaged under all counts, and had been so damaged for
numerous years prior to bringing a lawsuit. The doctrine of lac hes is defined as neglect to assert
a right or claim which taken together with a lapse of time when other circumstances causes
prejudice to the adverse party it should operate as a bar in a court of equity. Wooded Shores
Property Owners Association, Inc. v. A1atthews, 37 Ill.App.3d. 334,345 N.E. 2d.186,189. Both

parties testified that they had operated under this lease for approximately 11 years before this
lawsuit was filed. The testimony further indicated that the parties operation under this lease, as
well as defendants use of the upstairs, Space 16 and sidewalk space and the payment of the base
rent without providing specific information on the sales proceeds throughout the course of the
lease, continued without complaint or attempt by plaintiff to remedy until shortly before this
lawsuit. With respect to the percentage of rent, because plaintiff did not request defendant's sale
proceeds nor any additional rent based on the sales until shortly before this lawsuit was filed,
defendant detrimentally relied on plaintiffs inaction that this portion of the lease did not apply.
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Similarly, plaintiff did not request defendant to discontinue use of the sidewalk area, space 16,
the upstairs space and the use of the pipeyard until shortly before this lawsuit began. Defendant
again reasonable relied on plaintiffs silence and inaction for numerous years and acted under the
belief that he was in compliance. Plaintiff should be barred from all claims wherein the evidence
showed that he allowed activity to continue to the point where defendant believed he was
compliant and his activities were accepted and within the interpretation of the contract.
DATED this 5th day of March, 2010.
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC

By:
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, resident of and
with my office in Idaho Falls, Idaho; that on the 5th day of March, 2010, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing SUPPLEMENTAL CLOSING BRIEF to be served upon the
following persons at the addresses below their names either by depositing said document in the
United States mail with the correct postage thereon or by hand delivering or by transmitting by
facsimile as set forth below.

[X] Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Facsimile

BRYAND SMITH ESQ
BJ DRISCOLL ESQ
PO BOX 50731
IDAHO FALLS ID 83405-0731

THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES,

By:

MJW:thl
J:\data\MJW\6753\PLEADINGS\032 Sup Cl Brf.wpd
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONl\JEVILLE
THE WATKINS COMPANY, LLC, an Idaho
limited liability company.
Case No. CV-08-7258
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

V.

MICHAEL STORMS and KA THY
BURGGRAF.
Defendants.

This matter was before the Court on a Court trial on February 9. 2010. The Cou1i
having considered the evidence makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law.

FINDINGS OF FACT
Plaintiff The Watkins Company. LLC owns commercial real estate located at 455
River Parkway, Idaho Falls. Idaho (the Property). Dane Watkins, Sr. is Plaintiffs
managing partner. On July 31, 1996, Defendants Michael Storms and Kathy Burggraf
entered into a commercial lease agreement (the Lease) with Plaintiff to lease the
Property.
The term of the Lease began on November 1, 1997, and is scheduled to end on
October 31, 2027, for a total term of30 years, subject to two potential ten-year extensions
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at Defendants' option.

Defendants operated a microbrewery and restaurant on the

Property which restaurant was known as the Brownstone. Burggraf ceased active
involvement in managing the Brov-.11stone in 2002 and Storms purchased her interest in
2005. Storms continues to operate the Brownstone on the Property.
Except during the initial months of the Lease covered by prepaid rent, the Lease
requires Defendants to pay either a fixed base rent or five-percent of the Brownstone's
gross sales, whichever is greater.
The Lease does not specify on which day of the month rent is due. Historically,
Defendants have paid rent around the tenth of the month, after receiving the
Brownstone's utility bill and deducting Plaintiffs portion of the utilities from the rent
payment.
Since November 2003, Defendants have failed to pay $20,965.00 1 in rent for the
months where the percentage rent exceeded the base rent.
Addendum A to the Lease requires Defendants to provide the Brownstone's
monthly sales figures to Plaintiff by the tenth of each month. Addendum A to the Lease
also grants Plaintiff a power of attorney to obtain the monthly sales figures from the
Idaho State Tax Commission. Storms never provided Plaintiff with the Brownstone's
monthly sales figures and effectively revoked the power of attorney granted in the Lease
by instructing the Tax Commission to not provide any information to Plaintiff.
Under the Lease, Plaintiff is entitled to a $250 per month food and drink credit.
Although not spelled out in the Lease, Defendants have historically provided Plaintiff
Plaintiff claims the amount due for unpaid rent is $21,888.00. However, Storms presented evidence at
trial that he overpaid rent in August and September 2007 in the amount of $923.00, which he was not given
credit for. Storms provided check stubs stating the amount was for "rent." Dane Watkins testified that he
thought the $923.00 may have been for property taxes, but he wasn't sure. Therefore, based on the record,
the Court finds that the $923 .00 should be credited against the unpaid rent claimed by Plaintiff.
1
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with a year's worth of food and drink credit each December for the following year.
Defendants have not provided to Plaintiff any food and drink credit since December
2007, at which time they prepaid the credit through 2008.
Addendum B to the Lease apportions certain maintenance responsibilities
between the Parties. Plaintiffs responsibilities are denoted by the letter "L," while
Defendants' responsibilities are denoted by the letter

." Responsibility for roof repair is

designated as "T %." The Lease does not specify the exact percentage for which
Defendants are responsible.
The Brownstone shares a building with other businesses. The portion of roof
above the Brownstone only accounts for approximately 60 percent of the building's total
rooftop.
In the spring of 2005, Watkins hired Briggs Roofing Company to repair the roof.
Once Briggs repaired a portion of the roof including approximately 20 feet of the roof
above the Brovmstone, Storms paid $1,780.00 to Plaintiff for the work done on the
Brownstone's roof Then, on December 23, 2005, Storms paid an additional $5,000.00 to
Plaintiff for repairs on the remainder of the Brownstone's roof. On June 21. 2007, Storms
paid an extra $500.00 to Plaintiff as part of a settlement with Briggs Roofing over alleged
substandard repair work. On June 22, 2007, Plaintiff paid Briggs Roofing the $5,500.00 it
had received from Storms.
Plaintiff hired Waters Construction to repair damage allegedly caused by Briggs
Roofing's defective roof repair. Repair work was performed on the interior of the
building such as repairing water damaged sheet rock. On December 4, 2007, Plaintiff
paid Waters Construction $4,000.00 for the work it performed on the Property.
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Subject to ce1iain limitations, the Lease grants Defendants the right to have "an
outside deck." Further, Addendum D to the Lease references construction of a new
sidewalk and concrete flatwork adjace 1t to the Brownstone "where some planter boxes
1

and seating will be constructed." Since 2002, Defendants have used a po1iion of the
sidewalk area in front of the Brownstone in the summer months for additional seating.
Defendants have not paid any additional rent for use of the outside seating area and, until
recently, Plaintiff never requested that additional rent be paid for this space.
Pursuant to an oral agreement between the Parties, Defendants stored dry goods in
an upstairs storage space inside the Brownstone (the Upstairs Space) from the beginning
of the Lease through July 2009. Defendants paid $100.00 per month in rent for use of the
Upstairs Space. In June 2008, Plaintiff informed Storms that it was terminating the
month-to-month oral lease for the Upstairs Space, but that Storms could continue using
the Upstairs Space at an increased rent of $750.00. Despite this notice, Storms continued
to use the space for storage, continued to pay $100 a month until eventually vacating the
Upstairs Space in August 2009.
The Lease explicitly excludes from its coverage certain additional storage space
inside the Brownstone referred to as "Space #16." The Lease grants Defendants a right of
first refusal to rent Space #16 if and when it becomes available. As a courtesy, Plaintiff
allowed Defendants to use Space # 16 rent-free from the beginning of the Lease through
June 2008, at which time Plaintiff demanded that Storms vacate Space # 16. Storms
continued to use Space # 16 through July 2009.
In October 2006, Storms began storing a walk-in cooler on a portion of Plaintiffs
property near the Brownstone referred to as the "Pipeyard." The Lease does not cover use
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of the Pipeyard and Storms never paid any rent for storing the walk-in cooler at the
Pipeyard. In June 2008, Plaintiff advised Storms that he owed a "reasonable rental value''
for storing the cooler at the Pipeyard. Storms removed the cooler in June 2009.
In May 2007. a bridge providing access from Lindsay Boulevard to the
Brownstone's parking lot was damaged. Due to safety concerns, Plaintiff diverted traffic
away from the bridge. The bridge remained closed until April 2008. In response to
Plaintifrs alleged failure to timely repair the damaged bridge, Storms withheld partial
rent from November 2007 through March 2008.
Storms again withheld partial and then full rent from April 2008 through the
summer of 2008 due to Plaintiffs alleged failure to repair the Brownstone's leaking roof.
On June 12. 2008. Plaintiffs attorney, Bryan Smith. sent Storms· attorney,
Bradley Williams, a letter addressing ''multiple issues" between the Parties. The letter
demanded that Defendants pay $34,025.00 and provide certain gross sales information to
Plaintiff within IO days. Storms did not pay the amount requested in the letter or provide
the sales information to Plaintiff.
On July 10. 2008, Plaintiff sent Storms a "Three Day Notice to Pay Rent or Quit
the Premises" (the July Notice), wherein Plaintiff demanded $17,900.00 for unpaid
"rent." The July Notice stated that if Storms paid the full amount listed therein within
three days, then he "may remain in possession of the premises and in compliance with the
lease agreement." Storms timely paid the full amount requested in the July Notice.
On September 12, 2008, Plaintiff sent Storms another "Three Day Notice to Pay
Rent or Quit the Premises" (the September Notice), wherein Plaintiff demanded
$6,219.00 for unpaid "rent." The September Notice stated that if Storms paid the full

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LA \V
ir-:;"\b,..,_

{. (_

5

amount listed therein within three days, then he "may remam

111

possession of the

premises and in compliance with the lease agreement." Storms timely paid the full
amount requested in the September Notice.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Failure to Pay Rent and Remedies
Count 1 of the Amended Complaint alleges a breach of the Lease Agreement for
failure to pay rent. While the lease identified a term to begin on April 1, 1997, the Lease
does not specifically identify a monthly date when rent is due. Addendum A to the Lease
provides for a final calculation and payment of rent by the 15 th of each month.
Accordingly, the Court finds that the payment of rent prior to the 15 th of each month was
timely. Payment of rent on or before the 15 th of each month is also consistent with the
Patiies' course of conduct.
This Comi previously ruled that the provision in the Lease providing for rent
based upon 5% of gross sales was applicable throughout the term of the lease, with the
exception of the initial months of the lease which was covered by prepaid rent. There is
no dispute that historically Defendants failed to consistently pay rent when the 5% of
gross sales provision was applicable.

Storms further testified that he withheld rent

payments based upon grievances he had with Plaintiff regarding parking lot access, roof
repair, etc. There is no provision in the Lease allowing the tenant to withhold rent as an
offset for some real or perceived deficiency in the premises. While remedies exist for
such tenant complaints, the remedy is not a unilateral decision to withhold rent. Failure
to pay rent under these circumstances was a material breach of the Lease.
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Based upon a period of nonpayment of rent, Plaintiff served upon Defendant a
Three Day Notice to pay rent dated July 10, 2008. Ex. 18. The notice provided that if
$17.900 was paid within three days, Defendant "may remain in possession of the
property and in compliance with the lease agreement". The evidence established that the
$17,900 amount was based upon a calculation of base rent due. Nothing in the Notice or
subsequent payment by Defendant referred to rent which may be due under the 5%
provision. Fmthermore, the language in the Notice did not unequivocally indicate that
payment of the amount would constitute full payment of all rent due under the Lease.
Rather, upon payment Defendants " ... may remain ... in compliance ,vith the lease
agreement." (emphasis added).
Defendants haYe asserted that payment pursuant to the Notice was an accord and
satisfaction resolving all outstanding claims for payment. Defendants bear the burden of
proving all of the elements of an accord and satisfaction.
An "[a]ccord and satisfaction applies only if the parties knowingly and
intentionally accept new obligations or a different contractual
relationship.'' Hoglan 1·. First Security Bank of Idaho, NA., 120 Idaho
682,819 P.2d 100 (1991) (citing Harris v. Wildcat Corp., 97 Idaho 884.
556 P.2d 67 (1976)). The elements of an accord and satisfaction are:
( 1) a bona fide dispute as to the amount owed; (2) that the debtor tendered
an amount to the creditor with the intent that such payment would be in
total satisfaction of the debt owed to the creditor; and (3) that the creditor
agreed to accept payment in full satisfaction of the debt, or that both the
debtor and the creditor understood that the acceptance of the check was in
full payment of all sums owed by the debtor.
Perkins v. Highland Enterprises, Inc .. 120 Idaho 511, 817 P .2d 177 ( 1991)
(citing Fairchildv. Mathews, 91 Idaho 1,415 P.2d 43 (1966)). Accord and
satisfaction is an affirmative defense. See Bryan & Co. v. Kieckbusch, 94
Idaho 116, 482 P .2d 91 (1971 ). Therefore, the burden was upon Beard to
prove all the elements of an accord and satisfaction. See Clay v. Rossi, 62
Idaho 140, 108 P .2d 506 (1940). Since an accord and satisfaction is
basically the substitution of one contract for another, the debtor must
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prove that the creditor "definitely assented" to the new arrangement.
Nelson v. Armstrong, 99 Idaho 422, 582 P.2d 1100 (1978).
Beard v. George, 135 Idaho 685,689, 23 P.3d 147, 151 (2001).

The Court finds that the weight of the evidence establishes that the Notice
applied only to base rent due under the Lease.

At the time, Plaintiff did not have

documentation of gross sales by which it could calculate or propose a resolution as to rent
which may have been owed under the 5% provision. The Notice was not intended to be,
nor considered to be, a resolution of the ongoing issue of whether additional rent was
owed under the 5% provision. Accordingly, payment of the amount set out in the Notice
did not cure prior failures to pay 5% of gross sales as rent. It did however constitute an
accord and satisfaction to all claims for base rent and interest and late fees arising from
the nonpayment of base rent.
The same is true for the Three Day Notice dated September 12, 2008.

While

payment of the amount claimed in that notice resolved all issues of base rent due at that
time, it did not cure any default for unpaid rent due pursuant to the 5% provision.
In addition to the foregoing, where payment is made by a negotiable instrument,
l.C. § 28-3-310 applies. Specifically,§ 28-3-310(2) requires a conspicuous statement that
payment is for full satisfaction of all claims. The burden of proof to establish such a
conspicuous statement and a discharge of debt pursuant to the statute is on the debtor.
Holley v. Holley, 128 Idaho 503, 915 P.2d 733 (App. 1996).

The Court finds that there

was no conspicuous statement where the instrument indicated payment in full for all rent
which may have accrued under the 5% provision.
The record further establishes that after the September 12, 2008 notice, Defendant
failed to pay rent pursuant to the 5% provision.
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Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendant materially breached the Lease by
failing to pay rent. Damages for failure to pay rent pursuant to the Lease are $20,965 (the
amount claimed of $21,888 less the amount of an overpayment in August/September
2007 of $923 ).
The Lease also provided for 1% interest per month on delinquent rent.

This

interest rate would apply to unpaid rent pursuant to the 5% of gross sales provision. The
Court calculates that interest has accrued on the foregoing unpaid rent in the amount of
$3,781.25.
Plaintiff has also argued that a breach occurred when Defendant failed to provide
monthly sales reports. The Court agrees. Defendant was obligated to provide monthly
sales reports pursuant to the Lease, but failed to do so.

There are, however, no

separate/additional damages arising from this breach.
Having found a breach of the Lease by Defendants. the Court turns to the issue of
whether Plaintiff is entitled to an eviction of Defendant from the prope11y. The Lease
provides that upon a breach, the landlord may elect to terminate the lease: "In the event
of any breach of this lease by Lessee, Lessor may, at his option, terminate the lease .. .''.
By its complaint, it is clear Plaintiff has elected to terminate the lease.

Furthermore,

Plaintiff is entitled to terminate the lease inasmuch as the Court has found a material
breach on the part of the Defendants. Therefore, Plaintiff is entitled to evict Defendant
from the premises and regain possession.
As damages from the breach, Plaintiff also seeks accelerated rent. Paragraph 22 of
the Lease provides that Watkins may recover upon termination of the lease "the amount
by which unpaid rent for the balance of the term after the time of the award exceeds the
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amount of such rental loss that Lessee proves could be reasonably avoided ... ". Based
on the term of the Lease going through the year 2027, Plaintiff seeks in excess of one
million dollars for accelerated rent.
Pursuant to the Lease, recovery for unpaid rent is based on the "worth at the time
of the award" of the unpaid rent. In other words, the value or worth of unpaid future rent
was to be reduced to a present value. While the evidence set out what the total amount of
unpaid rent would be through 2027, there was no evidence reducing that amount to a
present value i.e., its worth at the time of trial.
A second issue relates to whether such a prov1s10n is enforceable. The Court
considers the accelerated rent prov1s10n to be tantamount to a liquidated damages
provision in the event of a breach of the Lease. See W. L. Scott, Inc. v. Afadras Aerotech,
Inc. 103 Idaho 736,747.653 P.2d 791,802 (1982). The analysis to be applied was well

stated in Miller

1·.

Remior, 86 ldaho 121, 128-129, 383 P.2d 596,600 - 601 (1963):

In Graves v. Cupie, supra, after an exhaustive analysis of the law bearing on
the subject, this Court reiterated the rule adopted in this jurisdiction, well
expressed by Perkins v. S'pencer, 121 Utah 468, 243 P.2d 446, quoting from
the earlier case of Bramwell Inv. Co. v. Uggla, 81 Utah 85, 16 P.2d 913, as
follows:

"* * * This

corn1 is committed to the doctrine, that where the parties to a
contract stipulate the amount of liquidated damages that shall be paid in case
of a breach, such stipulation is, as a general rule, enforceable, if the amount
stipulated is not disproportionate to the damages actually sustained."
This Court then reiterated the converse of such rule. also adopted in this
jurisdiction, that where the damages stipulated by the parties are clearly
unconscionable, exorbitant and arbitrary, and bear no reasonable relation to the
damages which the parties could have anticipated from the breach which
occurred, then the provision is to be interpreted as for a penalty and is
unenforceable. See also Scogings v. Love, 79 Idaho 179, 312 P.2d 570; Walker
v. Nunnenkamp, 84 Idaho 485, 373 P.2d 559. The rule is well stated in Howard
v. Bar Bell Land & Cattle Co., 81 Idaho 189,197.340 P.2d 103, as follows:
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'It is the lawful privilege of the parties to a contract for the sale of real
property to make time of performance of the essence of their agreement. It is
also their privilege to agree in advance upon the damages to be recompensed in
case of breach. The courts, both at law and in equity, must respect the
provisions of a contract lawfully agreed to. (Citations.) But. where the facts
make the damage agreed to an unconscionable penalty, equity will intercede to
grant relief. (Citation.)'

The law as set out in Jvliller was more recently stated in Hecla Jvlin. Co. v. StarMorning Min Co., 122 Idaho 778,796,839 P.2d 1192, 1210 (1992):

As a part of this allegation, plaintiffs argue that they may hold defendant
to the letter of the termination provisions of the 1984 Lease. They cite to
Nichols v. Knowles, 87 Idaho 550, 394 P.2d 630 (1964), and Howard v.
Bar Bell Land & Cattle Co., 81 Idaho 189,340 P.2d 103 (1959) for the
proposition that courts must 'respect the provisions of a contract lawfully
agreed to.' A closer look at both of these cases shows that where the
provisions of a contract, when strictly applied, would cause a forfeiture
and a resulting unconscionable penalty, equity will intercede to grant
relief. Nichols v. Knowles, 87 Idaho 550, 394 P.2d at 633; Howard v. Bar
Bell Land & Cattle Co., 81 Idaho 189, 340 P.2d at 107. The Idaho
Supreme Court in both Nichols and Howard cite to Graves v. Cupic et al.,
75 Idaho 451, 272 P.2d 1020 (1954). Graves clearly states that forfeitures
are abhorred by the co mis. Id, 2 72 P .2d at 1023.
As Plaintiff has argued, the burden is on the defendant to show that damages
awardable as accelerated rent are exorbitant or unconscionable. Howard v. Bar Bell Land
& Cattle Co., 81 Idaho 189, 340 P.2d 103 (1959); Scott, Inc. v. Madras Aerotech, lnc.,

supra.
Based on the foregoing, the critical issue is whether the liquidated damages are so
disproportionate to the damages actually sustained as to be exorbitant or unconscionable.
The Court finds that they are.
Actual damages would be based upon the time Defendant vacated the prope1iy to
the time a substitute tenant began paying rent. There is no basis to conclude that Plaintiff
could not find within a reasonable time a substitute tenant(s) upon regaining possession
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of the property. Such would in fact be Plaintiffs duty. Evidence was clear that the
building is in a very desirable location and as such, \vould draw the interest of many
potential tenants. While there may have been little evidence as to how long it might
actually take to re-lease the property, it is beyond reason to suggest it would take
anything close to seventeen years.
Accordingly, the Court finds the accelerated rent provision to be a penalty and
forfeiture, and therefore unenforceable.
2. Late Fees
The Lease provides for a late charge of $100 for each late rental payment. The
Court finds that late charges are applicable to those months when 5% of gross sales was
to be paid as rent, yet after deduction of credits, remained unpaid. Those months totaled
twenty-eight. Accordingly, Plaintiffs damages based upon late charges are $2,800.
3. Roof Repair
The Lease provides for the Parties' respective obligations with regard to interior
and exterior walls, pO\ver. roof, etc. See Addendum B. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants
have failed to pay their share of roof expenses which, according to Plaintiff, includes
repairs to the inside of the building necessitated by leaking from the defective roof
repairs. As set out in Addendum B, next to the various maintenance items there is an "L"
indicating the responsibility of the landlord or a "T'" representing the responsibility of the
tenant. T\VO notable exceptions to the foregoing are the roof which states "T¾" and
electrical power which states "* T 50%".

The asterisk to that entry clarifies that

"Landlord pays 50% of electric power during the term of the lease".
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Finding that the reference T% was ambiguous, the Court allowed parol evidence
on that issue. Storms testified that the agreement was that the tenant and landlord would
equally share expenses for the roof over the Brownstone restaurant area i.e., 50% each.
Watkins testified that the landlord bore no responsibility for the roof.

It is significant that Watkins undertook the responsibility to hire the roofing
contractor and coordinate and supervise the repairs. Such evidence lends itself to the
conclusion that the landlord was at least partially responsible for the cost of repairs. The
Court finds that the weight of the evidence establishes that the roof over the Brownstone
was to be an equally shared expense between the tenant and landlord. 2 Based on the
amount charged and paid for the repairs, the Court finds that there are no further amounts
owed by Defendants.
As a related matter, Defendant was granted an ongoing objection as to evidence
relating to a claim that Defendant had a responsibility for internal repairs required by
water damage. Defendant's objection was based on the grounds that such a claim was
outside the scope of the pleadings. Plaintiffs claim in this regard is contained in Count
Four of Plaintiffs amended complaint, which claim is limited to "roof repair expenses".
The Court hereby sustains Defendants' objection on the grounds that any claim based
upon anything other than repairs to the roof is outside the scope of the pleadings.
4. Upstairs Storage Area
Plaintiff seeks to recover rent for the upstairs storage space.

The Paiiies had

previously entered into an unwritten agreement that rent on the storage area would be

See also Plaintiffs Amended Complaint,
"p01tion" of the expenses.
2

iJ 22, wherein Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed to pay their
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$100 a month. There was no evidence that the arrangement was anything other than a
tenancy at will, which could be terminated upon a month's notice. LC.§ 55-208.
At least by January, 2007, Plaintiff desired to increase the rent for the storage
area. In a letter dated June 12, 2008 from Plaintiffs counsel to Defendants' counseL
Plaintiff notified Defendants that the $100 a month lease was terminated, but that
Defendants could continue to use the storage area based upon a rental of $750 a month.
ldaho Code § 55-307 provides as follows:
In all leases of lands or tenements, or of any interest therein from month to
month, the landlord may, upon giving notice in writing at least fifteen (15)
days before the expiration of the month, change the terms of the lease, to
take effect at the expiration of the month. The notice, when served upon
the tenant, shall of itself operate and be effectual to create and establish, as
a part of the lease, the terms, rent and conditions specified in the notice, if
the tenant shall continue to hold the premises after the expiration of the
month.
Accordingly, rental of the upstairs storage area as of July 1, 2008 was in the
amount of $750 a month.

Defendants' decision to continue to use the storage area

through July 2009 subjected them to the $750 a month rental charge.

Defendants

however, breached the month-to-month lease by continuing to use the prope1iy but not
paying the $750 a month rent. Watkins' damages on this issue after giving Defendants
credit for the $100 a month paid by Defendants are $8,450.
5. Storage Cooler
Watkins seeks to recover on the basis that Defendants were unjustly enriched by
keeping a storage cooler in the "pipeyard" area of Watkins' property.

There was no

evidence that the pipeyard was a critical or imp01iant area of the premises. The cooler
was first stored in the pipeyard in October 2006. There was no discussion of rent being
paid for storage until June 2008, when Plaintiff advised Storms that he owed a
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"reasonable rental value" for storing the cooler at the Pipeyard. No rent was paid and
Storms removed the cooler in June 2009.
Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing an unjust enrichment claim.
The elements of unjust enrichment are that (1) a benefit is conferred on the
defendant by the plaintiff; (2) the defendant appreciates the benefit; and
(3) it would be inequitable for the defendant to accept the benefit without
payment of the value of the benefit. Gibson v. Ada County, 142 Idaho 746,
759, 133 P.3d 1211, 1224 (2006).
Teton Peaks Inv. Co., LLC v. Ohme, 146 Idaho 394,398, 195 P.3d 1207, 211 (2008).

There was no evidence that Plaintiff needed the area of storage for some other
purpose. The Court finds that the initial storage of the cooler was permissive and as an
accommodation by the landlord to the tenant. While there was clearly a benefit to
Defendants, it would not be inequitable under these circumstances to allow storage
without the payment of rent. However, Defendants were notified in June 2008 of the
need to pay a reasonable amount as rent for the cooler storage. Following that notice, it
would be inequitable to continue to store the cooler without paying a rental value.
Accordingly, the Comi finds that a fair value for the unjust enrichment for the cooler
storage was $100 a month from July 2008 through June 2009, for a total of$ L200.
6. Space 16.
Plaintiff seeks to recover for the alleged unjust enrichment to Defendants for their
use of an area known as Space 16. That space was not part of the leased premises
although Defendants had the first right of refusal to the space. Nevertheless, Plaintiff
allowed Defendants to use the space as a storage area rent free until June 2008 when
Plaintiff requested that all of Defendants' property be removed from the space. However,
Storms continued to use Space #16 through July 2009.
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The Court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to recover under the theory of unjust
enrichment for the use of Space 16. Value of the unjust enrichment was $200 a month
from July 2008 through June 2009, for a total of $2,400.
7. Outdoor Dining Area.
Plaintiff seeks to recover under the theory of unjust enrichment for Defendants'
use of the area in front of the building for outdoor dining. Addendum B to the Lease
grants Defendants authority to use an "outside deck" for dining. The word "deck" is not
defined in the Lease. The Parties introduced parol evidence as to their intent regarding
outside dining, which included the possibility of a second floor platform over a portion of
the parking lot, or dining on the areas adjacent to the building. The primary concern as
set out in the Addendum was that outdoor dining not interfere with parking.
The Court finds that the historical use of the subject area for outdoor dining was
consistent with the Lease. The Court finds no material difference between an elevated
wood "deck" or a ground level concrete "deck", as long as it did not interfere with
parking. Additionally, to the extent the outdoor dining area required landlord approval,
the evidence established that Watkins was aware of the use and made no complaint for a
number of years. Approval of the designated area for outside dining was at least implicit.
Additionally, Defendant has raised the defense of laches. The Court finds that
defense applicable to Plainti±rs claim that outdoor dining was a breach of the Lease, or
grounds for unjust enrichment.
It is further worth noting that increased revenue to the restaurant through outside
dining was also beneficial to Plaintiff inasmuch rental based on 5% of gross sales would
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increase. As such, even if use of the outdoor area wasn't contemplated by the Lease, there
is no inequity to the landlord since the landlord also benefits from the use.
8. Food and Drink Credit.
Addendum A to the Lease provides the following:
Landlord will be entitled to a $250 food and drink credit per month
to be used at his discretion, i.e., gift ce1iificates or food and drink. This
credit will be cumulative.
The evidence establishes that Defendants have not provided to Plaintiff any food
and drink credit after 2008. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to $250
of food and drink credit for each month from January 2009 forward. Failing to provide
the credit constitutes a breach of the Lease. Plaintiffs damages from that breach are
equal to the amount of the credit which was to be provided. As of February 28, 2010,
damages are $3,500.
CONCLUSION
Defendant materially breached the Lease and Plaintiff is therefore entitled to
terminate the Lease, evict Defendant, and regain possession of the prope1iy. Plaintiff is
fmiher entitled to recover damages for breach of the leases and for unjust enrichment.
Plaintiffs damages in this matter are $43,096.25.
Dated this

{{p day of March, 2010.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
()
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this~- day of March, 2010, I did send a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document upon the parties listed below by mailing, with the
correct postage thereon: by causing the same to be placed in the respective courthouse
mailbox: or by causing the same to be hand-delivered.

B.J. Driscoll
Stv1ITH DRISCOLL &
AS SOCIA TES. PLLC
P.O. Box 50731
Idaho Falls, ID 83405
Michael J. Whyte
THOMSEN STEPHENS
LAW OFFICES. PLLC
2635 Channing Way
Idaho Falls. ID 83404
RONALD LONGMORE
Clerk of the District Court
Bonneville County, Idaho

By

:yn4/

Deputy Clerk

FINDIJ\JGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
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Bryan D. Smith, Esq. - ISB #4411
B. J. Driscoll, Esq. - ISB # 7010
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC
414 Shoup Ave.
P.O. Box 50731
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405
Telephone: (208) 524-0731
Facsimile: (208) 529-4166

lO

p
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Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUl\JTY OF BONNEVILLE

THE WATKINS COMPANY, LLC,
an Idaho limited liability company,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-08-7258

JUDGMENT

V.

MICHAEL STORMS and KA THY
BURGGRAF,
Defendants.

IN THIS MATTER, the court having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law, dated March 16, 2010, it is hereby ordered that a Judgment be entered herein
against the said Defendants, Michael Storms and Kathy Burggraf, in accordance with said
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on file herein.
WHEREFORE, by reason of the law and the premises aforesaid, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that The Watkins Company, LLC, plaintiff,
does have and recover of and from said defendants, Michael Storms and Kathy Burggraf,

I
I.'

,JUDGMENT - Page 1
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the sum of $43 .096.25, and that plaintiff further recover lawful interest on the foregoing
judgment until paid and that execution may issue on the foregoing judgment.
JUDGMENT RENDERED this

'1-:> day of March, 2010.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this .i13day of March, 2010, I caused a true and
correct copy of the attached JUDGMENT to be served, by placing the same in a sealed
envelope and depositing in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, or hand delivery,
facsimile transmission or overnight delivery, addressed to the following:
B. J. Driscoll, Esq.
SMITH. DRISCOLL &
ASSOCIATES, PLLC
P. 0. Box 50731
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-0731

[ \-YU. S. Mail
[ ] Fax
[ J Overnight Delivery
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Email

[ q'~. S. Mail

J Michael J. Whyte,
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW
OFFICES, PLLC
2635 Channing Way
Idaho Falls, ID 83404

[

] Fax

[ ] Overnight Delivery
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Email

Clerk

JUDGMENT - Page 2
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B. J. Driscoll, Esq. --ISB # 7010
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC
414 Shoup Ave.
P.O. Box 50731
Idaho Falls. Idaho 83405
Telephone: (208) 524-0731
Facsimile: (208) 529-4166

!()

Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

TIIE WATKTNS COMPANY, LLC,
an Idaho limited liability company,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-08-7258

.JUDGMENT FOR RESTITUTION

V.

MICHAEL STORMS and KATHY
BURGGRAF,

MAR 2 1i 2010

Defendants.

lN THIS MATTER. the court having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law, dated March 16, 2010, that the plaintiff is entitled to evict the Defendants,
Michael Storms and Kathy Burggraf, and to restitution of the premises, it is hereby
ordered that this Judgment for Restitution be entered herein against the said Defendants
in accordance with said Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on file herein.
WHEREFORE, by reason of the law and the premises aforesaid, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that The Watkins Company, LLC, plaintiff,
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is entitled to judgment for restitution of the premises located at 455 River Parkway, Idaho
Falls. Idaho, and that execution may issue immediately by writ of restitution.
FURTHER. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED
pursuant to Idaho Code Section 6-316 that the defendants forfeit their lease of the
aforesaid premises.
JUDGMENT RENDERED this

L ·-;-

day of March, 2010.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
__,.
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this dQ day of March, 2010, I caused a true and
correct copy of the attached JUDGMENT FOR RESTITUTION to be served, by
placing the same in a sealed envelope and depositing in the United States Mail, postage
prepaid, or hand delivery, facsimile transmission or overnight delivery, addressed to the
follmving:

[ GY'U. S. Mail

B. J. Driscoll, Esq.
SMITH, DRISCOLL &
AS SOCIA TES, PLLC
P. 0. Box 5073 I
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405-0731

[
[
[
[

]
]
]
]

Fax
Overnight Delivery
Hand Delivery
Email

[vJ U. S. Mail

J Michael J. Whyte, Esq.
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW
OFFICES, PLLC
2635 Cham1ing Way
Idaho Falls, ID 83404

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

Clerk
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Fax
Overnight Delivery
Hand Delivery
Email

Bryan D. Smith, Esq. - ISB #4411
B. J. Driscoll, Esq. - ISB # 7010
SMITH, DRISCOLL & AssocIA TES, PLLC
414 Shoup Ave.
P.O. Box 50731
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405
Telephone: (208) 524-0731
Facsimile: (208) 529-4166
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STA TE OF IDAHO, fN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

THE WATKINS COMPANY, LLC,
an Idaho limited liability company,

Case No. CV-08-7258

Plaintiff,

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
FOR AWARD OF PREJUDGMENT
INTEREST

V.

MICHAEL STORMS and KATHY
BURGGRAF,
Defendants.

I.

INTRODUCTION.
On March 16, 2010, this court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

("Findings & Conclusions") regarding the claims of the plaintiff, The Watkins Company,
LLC ("Watkins"), against the defendants, Michael Storms and Kathy Burggraf
("Defendants"). In its Findings & Conclusions, the court previously awarded Watkins
prejudgment interest on unpaid alternative rent. Watkins now seeks to recover
prejudgment interest on the unpaid Late Fees, Upstairs Storage, Pipeyard Storage, Space

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR A WARD OF PREJUDGMENT INTEREST - Page 1
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16 Storage, and Food and Drink Credit that the court awarded. As set forth below,
Watkins requests that the court award prejudgment interest in the amount of $3,005.92.

II.

WATKINS IS ENTITLED TO PREJUDGMENT INTEREST IN THE AMOUNT
OF $3,005.92.
Idaho Code Section 28-22-104 calls for the award of prejudgment interest on

certain types of money claims. Jones v. Whiteley, 112 Idaho 886 (Ct.App.1987).
Prejudgment interest is allowed where the damages are liquidated or readily ascertainable
by mathematical process. Id.; Child v. Blaser, 111 Idaho 702 (Ct.App.1986). "[W]here
the amount of liability is liquidated or capable of ascertainment by mere mathematical
processes" interest is allowed from a time prior to judgment, "for in that event the
interest in fully compensating the injured party predominates over other equitable
considerations." Farm Dev. Corp. v. Hernandez, 93 Idaho 918 (1970) (emphasis added)

(quoting United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Clover Creek Cattle Co., 92 Idaho
889, 900 (1969)); see also Doolittle v. Meridian Joint Sch. Dist. No. 2, 128 Idaho 805,
814, (1996); Davis v. Prof! Bus.Serv., Inc., 109 Idaho 810, 817 (1985); Child v. Blaser,
supra, 111 Idaho at 706-707.

The mere fact that a claim is disputed or litigated does not render damages
"unascertainable," for if this were the case, a party could delay payment without
incurring interest expense by disputing and litigating any claim, and prejudgment interest
would never be awarded. Ace Realty, Inc., v. Anderson, 106 Idaho 742, 751
(Ct.App.1984); see also Mitchell v. Flandro, 95 Idaho 228, 235 (1972). A claim is
liquidated if the evidence furnishes data which, if believed, makes it possible to compute
the amount with exactness, without reliance upon opinion or discretion. Seubert
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Excavators, Inc. v. Eucon Corp., 125 Idaho 744, 75011. 2 (Ct.App. l 993t affd, 125 Idaho
409 (1994).

A.

The Court Should Award $931.30 In Prejudgment Interest On The Unpaid
Late Fees.

Here, the court found the Defendants liable to Watkins for late fees for those 28
months that Defendants did not pay the full rent due under the lease. The Lease provides
that "Tenant agrees to pay a late charge of $100 plus interest at 1% per month on the
delinquent amount." 1 The late fees are liquidated and mathematically ascertainable, so
Watkins is entitled to prejudgment interest in the amount of $931.30, calculated by taking
the $100 late fee multiplied by 12%, then divided by 365 days to detennine a daily rate of
simple interest, then multiplied by the number of days from the date the late fee accrued
through the date the court entered the judgment on March 23, 201 o.2
B.

The Court Should Award $1,241.38 In Prejudgment Interest On The
Unpaid Upstairs Storage Rent.

Here. the court found the Defendants liable to Watkins for Upstairs Storage rent of
$650 per month from July 2008 through July 2009.

The rent is liquidated and

mathematically ascertainable, so Watkins is entitled to prejudgment interest in the amount of
$1,241.38, calculated by taking the $650 unpaid rent per month multiplied by 12%, then

divided by 365 days to determine a daily rate of simple interest, then multiplied by the
number of days from the date the rent accrued through the date the court entered the
judgment on March 23, 2010. 3

See i2 of Plaintiffs Exhibit I.
To illustrate these calculations, please see Exhibit "A" attached hereto.
3 To illustrate these calculations, please see Exhibit "A" attached hereto.
1

2
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C.

The Court Should Award $182.27 In Prejudgment Interest On The Unpaid
Pipeyard Storage.

Here, the court found the Defendants liable to Watkins for Pipeyard Cooler Storage
of $ 100 per month from July 2008 through June 2009. This amount is liquidated and
mathematically ascertainable, so Watkins is entitled to prejudgment interest in the amount of
$182.27, calculated by taking the $100 per month multiplied by 12%, then divided by 365
days to determine a daily rate of simple interest, then multiplied by the number of days from
the date the late fee accrued through the date the court entered the judgment on March 23,
2010. 4
D.

The Court Should Award $364.54 In Prejudgment Interest On The Unpaid
Space # 16 Storage.

Here, the court found the Defendants liable to Watkins for Space # 16 Storage of
$200 per month from July 2008 through June 2009.

This amount is liquidated and

mathematically ascertainable, so Watkins is entitled to prejudgment interest in the amount of
$364.54, calculated by taking the $200 per month multiplied by 12%, then divided by 365
days to determine a daily rate of simple interest, then multiplied by the number of days from
the date the late fee accrued through the date the court entered the judgment on March 23,
2010. 5
E.

The Court Should Award $286.44 In Prejudgment Interest On The Unpaid
Food And Drink Credit.

Here, the court found the Defendants liable to Watkins for unpaid Food and Drink
Credits of $250 per month from January 2009 through February 2010. This amount is
liquidated and mathematically ascertainable, so Watkins is entitled to prejudgment interest
in the amount of $286.44, calculated by taking the $250 per month multiplied by 12%, then
4

5

To illustrate these calculations, please see Exhibit "A" attached hereto.
To illustrate these calculations, please see Exhibit "A" attached hereto.
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divided by 365 days to determine a daily rate of simple interest, then multiplied by the
number of days from the date the late fee accrued through the date the court entered the
judgment on March 23, 2010. 6
III.

CONCLUSION.
Based on the foregoing, the court should award Watkins $3,005.92 in

prejudgment interest.
DATED this

5(

day of March, 2010.
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC

.J

Driscoll, Esq.
: y s for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
1 HEREBY CERTIFY that on this _1L day of March, 2010, I caused a true and
correct copy of the attached BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR AWARD OF
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST to be served, by placing the same in a sealed envelope
and depositing in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, or hand delivery, facsimile
transmission or overnight delivery, addressed to the following:

J Michael J. Whyte, Esq.
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW
OFFICES, PLLC
2635 Channing Way
Idaho Falls, ID 83404

6

[
[
[
[
[

~ S. Mail
]
]
]
]

Fax
Overnight Delivery
Hand Delivery
Email

To illustrate these calculations, please see Exhibit "A" attached hereto.
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EXHIBIT "A"

SUMMARY
Prejudgment Interest
Late Fees
Upstairs Storage
Pipeyard Storage
Space 16 Storage
Food & Drink Credit
TOTAL

f',..

')

iOi

Amount
$ 931.30
$ 1,241.38
$
182.27
$ 364.54
$ 286.44
$ 3,005.92

Month
Dec-03
May-04
Jul-04
Auq-04
Jun-05
Jul-05
Auq-05
Sep-05
May-06
Jun-06
Auq-06
May-07
Jun-07
Jul-07
Auq-07
May-08
Jun-08
Jul-08
Auq-08
Sep-08
Apr-09
May-09
Jun-09
Jul-09
Auq-09
Sep-09
Oct-09
Dec-09
Totals

Days thru At 12%
Late Fee 3/23/2010* Interest
75.25
2289 $
$ 100.00
2137 $
70.26
$ 100.00
2076
100.00
68.25
$
$
67.23
2045 $
$ 100.00
1741 $
57.24
$ 100.00
1711 $
56.25
$ 100.00
1680 $
55.23
$ 100.00
1649 $
54.21
$ 100.00
1407 $
46.26
$ 100.00
1376 $
45.24
$ 100.00
1315 $
43.23
$ 100.00
1042 $
34.26
$ 100.00
1011 $
33.24
$ 100.00
100.00
981
$
32.25
$
950 $
31.23
$ 100.00
676 $
22.22
$ 100.00
21.21
645 $
$ 100.00
615 $
20.22
$ 100.00
19.20
584 $
$ 100.00
553 $
18.18
$ 100.00
341 $
11.21
$ 100.00
311
100.00
10.22
$
$
280 $
9.21
$ 100.00
250 $
8.22
$ 100.00
219 $
7.20
$ 100.00
188 $
6.18
$ 100.00
158 $
5.19
$ 100.00
97 $
3.19
$ 100.00
$ 931.30
$ 2,800.00

*Days calculated from the 16th of the month due.

Month
Jul~08
Aug-08
Sep-08
Oct-08
Nov-08
Dec-08
Jan-09
Feb-09
Mar-09
Apr-09
May-09
Jun-09
Jul-09
Totals

Upstairs
Days thru
Storage
3/23/2010
630
$ 650.00
599
$ 650.00
568
650.00
$
538
$ 650.00
507
$ 650.00
477
$ 650.00
446
$ 650.00
415
$ 650.00
387
$ 650.00
356
$ 650.00
326
$ 650.00
295
$ 650.00
265
$ 650.00
$ 8,450.00

At 12%
Interest
$ 134.63
$ 128.01
$ 121.38
$ 114.97
$ 108.35
$ 101.93
95.31
$
88.68
$
82.70
$
76.08
$
69.67
$
63.04
$
56.63
$
$1,241.38

Month
Jul-08
Aug-08
Sep-08
Oct-08
Nov-08
Dec-08
Jan-09
Feb-09
Mar-09
Apr-09
Mav-09
Jun-09
Totals

Pipeyard
$ 100.00
$ 100.00
$ 100.00
$ 100.00
$ 100.00
$ 100.00
$ 100.00
$ 100.00
$ 100.00
$ 100.00
$ 100.00
$ 100.00
$1,200.00

Days thru IAt 12%
3/23/2010 Interest
20.71
630 $
19.69
599 $
18.67
568 $
538 $
17.69
16.67
507 $
477 $
15.68
446 $
14.66
415 $
13.64
12.72
387 $
356 $
11.70
326 $
10.72
295 $
9.70
$ 182.27

253

Month
Jul-08
Aug-08
Sep-08
Oct-08
Nov-08
Dec-08
Jan-09
Feb-09
Mar-09
Apr-09
May-09
Jun-09
Totals

Space #16
$ 200.00
$ 200.00
$ 200.00
$ 200.00
$ 200.00
$ 200.00
$ 200.00
$ 200.00
$ 200.00
$ 200.00
$ 200.00
$ 200.00
$ 2,400.00

Days thru
3/23/2010
630
599
568
538
507
477
446
415
387
356
326
295

')/... 5" ;.1f

At 12%
Interest
41.42
$
39.39
$
37.35
$
35.38
$
33.34
$
31.36
$
29.33
$
27.29
$
25.45
$
23.41
$
21.44
$
19.40
$
364.54
$

Food & Drink Days thru
3/23/2010
Month Credit
Jan-09 $
250.00
446
250.00
Feb-09 $
415
250.00
Mar-09 $
387
Apr-09 $
250.00
356
May-09 $
250.00
326
250.00
295
Jun-09 $
Jul-09 $
250.00
265
Auq-09 $
250.00
234
Sep-09 $
250.00
203
Oct-09 $
250.00
173
250.00
Nov-09 $
142
Dec-09 $
250.00
112
Jan-10 $
250.00
81
Feb-10 $
250.00
50
3,500.00
Totals
$

At 12%
Interest
$ 36.66
$ 34.11
$ 31.81
$ 29.26
$ 26.79
$ 24.25
$ 21.78
$ 19.23
$ 16.68
$ 14.22
$ 11.67
$ 9.21
$ 6.66
$ 4.11
$ 286.44

Michael J. Whyte, Esq., ISB #4645
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC
26 3 5 Channing Way
Idaho Falls ID 83404
Telephone (208)522-1230
Fax (208)522-1277
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Attorney for Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRJCT OF THE
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
THE WATKINS COMP ANY, LLC,
an Idaho limited liability company,
Plaintiff,
V.

MICHAEL STORMS and KA THY
BURGGRAF,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-08-7258

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
MEMORANDUM RE: COSTS AND
ATTORNEY FEES

COME NOW defendants, by and through their attorney of record and files this Brief in
support of their motion for attorney fees and costs.
STATEMENT OF CASE
Plaintiff filed the complaint in this matter seeking relief under numerous claims.
Specifically, in the Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, plaintiff sought the following:
Count One - $23,947.46 for late fees and interest for failing to timely pay the rent; Count Two $1,023,750.00 in accelerated rent; Count Three - Failure to provide monthly sales reports and an
amount to be proven at trial; Count Four - $4,500.00 for roof repair expenses; Count Five -

1-
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$9,400.00 for use of an upstairs storage space; Count Six - $4,900.00 for use of outdoor space to
store a cooler; Count Seven- $6,800.00 for use of Space # 16; Count Eight - $30,500.00 for use of
outdoor dining space; Count Nine- Eviction; Count Ten - $250 per month for food and drink credits.
The total sought by plaintiff was $1,106,797.46 from defendant Michael Storms and $1,055,197.46
from defendant Kathy Burggraf, (not including the amounts sought for percentage rents not paid).
At the conclusion of the trial the Court awarded damages to plaintiff in the amount of $43,096.25.

APPLICABLE LAW
Prior to awarding attorney fees and costs, the Court needs to determine the prevailing party.
In the case of Sanders v. Lankford, 134 Idaho 322, 1 P.3d. 823 (Ct. App. 2000), the Idaho Court of
Appeals, in considering whether the trial court had properly acted in determining the prevailing
party, stated:
On the prevailing party issue, governing legal standards are provided by Idaho Rule
of Civil Procedure 54( d)(l )(B), which states: In determining which party to an action
is a prevailing party and entitled to costs, the trial court shall in its sound discretion
consider the final judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief sought by
the respective parties, whether there were multiple claims, multiple issues,
counterclaims, third party claims, cross-claims, or other multiple or cross issues
between the parties, and the extent to which each party prevailed upon each of such
issue or claims. The trial court in its sound discretion may determine that a party to
an action prevailed in part and did not prevail in part, and upon so finding may
apportion the costs between and among the parties in a fair and equitable manner
after considering all of the issues and claims involved in the action and resultant
judgment or judgments obtained.
Thus, under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B), there are three principal factors the trial court must
consider when determining which party, if any, prevailed: (1) the final judgment or
result obtained in relation to the relief sought; (2) whether there were multiple claims
or issues between the parties; and (3) the extent to which each of the parties prevailed
on each of the claims or issues. Chadderdon, l 04 Idaho at 411,659 P.2d at 165. The
result obtained may be the product of a court judgment or of a settlement reached by
2-
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the parties. JerryJ Joseph, CL. U Assoc., 117 Idaho at 557, 789 P.2d at 1148; Ladd
v. Coats, 105 Idaho 250,254,668 P.2d 126, 130 (Ct. App. 1983).

Sanders 134 Idaho at 325.
Pursuant to IRCP 54( d)(l )(B) this Court needs to consider the three factors to determine the
prevailing party. The first factor is the final judgment in relation to the relief sought. As indicated
previously, plaintiff sought a total amount of $1,106,797.46 from defendant Michael Storms and
$1,055,197.46 from defendant Kathy Burggraf. However, after all evidence was presented, the Court
only awarded plaintiff $43,096.25. This is less than 4% of the total sought in plaintiff's amended
complaint. Thus under the first factor, defendants are the prevailing parties.
The largest portion of the damages sought was contained in Count Two wherein plaintiff
sought accelerated rent in the amount of $1,023.750. If this amount is removed from the calculation,
then the total sought by plaintiff in its amended complaint was $83,047.96, not including the amount
sought for unpaid percentage rent because that amount was unknown when the amended complaint
was filed. However, in a motion for partial summary judgment filed a few months prior to trial,
plaintiff calculated its damages of additional unpaid rent at $28,903.39.

Adding this to the

$83,047.96, then plaintiff was seeking damages in the amount of $111,950.85 (other than the
accelerated rent). Comparing this to the amount actually recovered, plaintiff only recovered 38%
of this amount sought. Even removing the greatest single amount sought by plaintiff (accelerated
rent), plaintiff recovered significantly less than the original relief sought, leaving defendants as the
prevailing parties.
The second and third factors need to be reviewed jointly in that there were multiple claims
or issues and the result of those claims. In this action, plaintiff's amended complaint raised ten

3-
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separate counts, each a distinct claim seeking separate relief, not claims plead in the alternative. At
the conclusion of the trial the Court denied all amounts sought under Count Two, Count Four and
Count Eight The total sought under these three claims was $1,058,750 The Court awarded some,
but not all amounts sought in the remaining Counts. Again, in reviewing and comparing the total
amounts sought in each claim against the total awarded, plaintiff prevailed in only a small portion
of its claims.
In reviewing all 54( d)( 1)(B) factors defendants are the prevailing parties. However, plaintiff
did prevail on some of its claims. Under these circumstances, the Court could apportion the costs
and fees in a fair and equitable manner given the issues presented by plaintiff and the relief actually
awarded to plaintiff.
DA TED this 6th day of April, 2010.
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC

By:
~ichao/ 1LJ1hyte, Esq.

(

'--

4-

I

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM RE: COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, resident of and with
my office in Idaho Falls, Idaho; that on the 6th day of April, 2010, I caused a true and correct copy

of the foregoing BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MEMORANDUM RE: COSTS AND ATTORNEY
FEES to be served upon the following persons at the addresses below their names either by
depositing said document in the United States mail with the correct postage thereon or by hand
delivering or by transmitting by facsimile as set forth below.

B J DRISCOLL ESQ
PO BOX 50731
IDAHO FALLS ID 83405-073 l

[X] Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Facsimile

THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC

By:

MJW:clrn
6753\028 Brief- Attorney Fees
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO,

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

THE WATKINS COMPANY, LLC,
an Idaho limited liability
company,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MICHAEL STORMS and KATHY
BURGGRAF,
Defendants.
On the 9th day of April,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

MINUTE ENTRY
Case No.
CV-08-7258

2010, Defendants' objection to writ

of possession came before the Honorable Joel E. Tingey, District
Judge,

in open court at Idaho Falls,

Idaho.

Mr. Jack Fuller, Court Reporter, and Mrs. Marlene Southwick,
Deputy Court Clerk, were present.
No one appeared on behalf of the Plaintiff.
Mr. Michael Whyte appeared on behalf of the Defendants.
Mr. Whyte presented Defendants' objection to writ of
possession.
There is a joint stipulation to set aside the judgment for
restitution.

The Court will not sign an order for immediate

possession as things stand at this time.

Mr. Whyte will prepare

a proposed order for the Court's signature.

nC ·1

(~ u .l

Court was thus adjourned.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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day of April, 2010, I
I hereby certify that on the
caused a true and correct c o p ~ the foregoing document to
be delivered to the following:
RONALD LONGMORE

Deputy Court Clerk
Bryan D. Smith
B. J. Driscoll
PO Box 50731
Idaho Falls, ID

83405

Michael J. Whyte
2635 Channing Way
Idaho Falls, ID 83404

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO,

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

THE WATKINS COMPANY, LLC,
an Idaho limited liability
company,
Plaintiff,
MINUTE ENTRY
Case No.
CV-08-7258

VS.

MICHAEL STORMS and KATHY
BURGGRAF,
Defendants.
On the 20th day of April, 2010, Plaintiff's motion for award
of prejudgment interest and Defendants' motion for attorney fees
and costs came before the Honorable Joel E. Tingey, District
Judge, in open court at Idaho Falls, Idaho.
Mr. Jack Fuller, Court Reporter, and Mrs. Marlene Southwick,
Deputy Court Clerk, were present.
Mr. B. J. Driscoll appeared on behalf of the Plaintiff.
Mr. Michael Whyte appeared on behalf of the Defendants.
Mr. Driscoll presented Plaintiff's motion for award of
prejudgment interest and presented argument in opposition to
Defendants' motion for attorney fees and costs.

Mr. Whyte

presented Defendants' motion for attorney fees and costs and
argument in opposition to Plaintiff's motion for award of
prejudgment interest.
The Court will issue a written decision on the motions.

Court was thus adjourned.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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day of April, 2010, I
I hereby certify that on the
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing document to
be delivered to the following:
RONALD LONGMORE

__Deputy
)J~fkJ/~-Court Clerk
Bryan D. Smith
B. J. Driscoll
PO Box 50731
Idaho Falls, ID

83405

Michael J. Whyte
2635 Channing Way
Idaho Falls, ID 83404
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT Of THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
THE WATKINS COMPANY, LLC, an Idaho
limited liability company,
Case No. CV-08-7258
Plaintiff,
vs.
MICHAEL STORMS and KA THY
BURGGRAF,

ORDER ON MOTION FOR COSTS AND
ATTORNEY FEES AND PREJUDGMENT
INTEREST

Defendants.

l. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

Plaintiff brought this action seeking to recover on claims arising out of a lease agreement
and the use of the subject premises by Defendant. Following a court trial, the Court issued its
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. As set out in that decision Plaintiff prevailed on
some, but not all of its claims. Specifically, Plaintiff prevailed on the breach of contract claim
although no recovery was allowed for roof repairs or outside dining. As to the other breach of
contract issues, the amount of damages awarded was less than requested. Plaintiff also prevailed
on unjust enrichment claims although recovery was less than requested.
Both Parties have now moved for costs and attorney fees. Plaintiff has also moved for an
award of prejudgment interest.

II. ANALYSIS
A. Costs and Attorney Fees

ORDER ON MOTION FOR COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES
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Under Rule 54(d)(l )(B), I.R.C.P ., it is appropriate to consider results obtained in view of
the relief sought ,vhen determining a prevailing party:
In detennining which party to an action is a prevailing party and entitled
to costs, the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider the final judgment or
result of the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties.
In identifying a prevailing pru-ty, a court may consider whether a party prevailed on the
"main issue'' or ·'most significant issue" which consumed most of the time at trial. Anderson v.
Schwegel, 118 Idaho 362,367, 796 P.2d 1035, 1040 (App. 1990); Chadderdon v. King, 104

Idaho 406, 659 P.2d 160 (App. 1983); Rural Kootenai Organization, Inc. v. Board of Com'rs
133 Idaho 833, 846, 993 P.2d 596, 609 (1999). The fact that the damages recovered by a party
were less than requested does not preclude a finding that the paiiy prevailed: "We do not believe
that merely because Collins received less than the entire runount of damages requested, she is
therefore not a prevailing party." Collins v. Jones, 131 Idaho 556, 559, 961 P.2d 647,650
(1998). See also Gilbert v. City ofCaldwell, 112 Idaho 386,

P.2d 355, wherein the

prevailing party only recovered approximately $7,500 of the total amount claimed of over
$160,000.
Here, the Comi considers the main issue in the litigation to be Defendant's breach of
contract and failure to pay the required rental amount. Plaintiff prevailed on that issue.
Considering the total outcome of the trial and the Parties' respective success and failure, the
Court finds Plaintiff to be the prevailing party.
Significantly, Rule 54(e)(3), 1.R.C.P. provides that the "results obtained" is a factor for
consideration in determining the amount of attorney fees to be awarded. Accordingly, the Court
has discretion to consider Plaintiffs limited recovery for purposes of tempering an award of
attorney fees, but not for precluding outright a finding that Plaintiff was the prevailing party.

ORDER ON MOTION FOR COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES
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As the prevailing pa1iy, Plaintiff is entitled to costs as a matter of right (Rule 54( d)(l )(C))
in the amount of $1 J 78.53. As to Plaintiffs claim for discretionary costs under Rule
54( d)( 1)(D), the Court finds that such costs were not exceptional costs which in the interest of
justice should be awarded against the Defendants.
As the prevailing party, Plaintiffs may be entitled to an award of attorney fees if
authorized by statute or contract. A claim for attorney fees is to be deemed as costs and
processed in the same manner. IRCP Rule 54( e )(5). As to the application of I.C. § 12-120(3), the
gravamen of this action was based on a contract and commercial transaction.
Idaho Code section 12-120( 3) compels an award of attorney fees to the
prevailing party in an action to recover on a commercial transaction. I.C. § 12120(3): BECO Constr. Co., Inc. v. .f-U-B Eng'rs, Inc., 145 Idaho 719, 726, 184
P.3d 844, 851 (2008). A court must award attorney fees to the prevailing party in
an action to recover on a "commercial transaction." I.C. § 12-120(3); BECO, 145
Idaho at 726, 184 P .3d at 851. A "commercial transaction" is defined as "all
transactions except transactions for personal or household purposes." I.C. § 12120(3). The test to determine whether this section applies is whether the
commercial transaction comprises the gravamen of the lawsuit; it must be integral
to the claim and constitute the basis upon which the party is attempting to recover.
.Johannsen v. Utterbeck, 146 Idaho 423,432, 196 P.3d 341,350 (2008).

Troupis v. Summer, 148 Idaho 77, 81,218 P.3d 1138, 1142 (2009).
Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to attorney fees under § 12-120(3).
Plaintiff has also identified

il 26 of the

Lease Agreement as a basis for an award of

attorney fees. That paragraph provides that the prevailing party in a dispute arising from the
Lease is entitled to an award of attorney fees. Again, as to claims arising out of the subject
Lease, the Court has found Plaintiff to be the overall prevailing party.
This Court has reviewed the record and Plaintiff's motion and affidavit filed in supp01i of
the claim for attorney fees. The Court has considered the respective claims made in this matter,
the nature and progress of the litigation, and the ultimate outcome. Again, while Plaintiff was the
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overall prevailing party, the Court found against Plaintiff on some issues and did not award all
damages requested. The Court has further considered the factors set out in Rule 54( e )(3 ),
I.R.C.P., including but not limited to the time required, the novelty and difficulty of the case,
prevailing rates for attorney fees, and duplication of effort. Of the fees claimed, there will also be
some discount based on billings not directly related to this action. Again, a discount of the
amount of attorney fees claimed is appropriate in view those issues wherein the Court found
against Plaintiff.
This Court finds based upon the record that Plaintiff is entitled to an award of attorney
fees in the amount of $22,128.
B. Prejudgment Interest
The Court previously awarded prejudgment interest on the portion of the Judgment
relating to unpaid rent on the premises. Plaintiff now seeks an order from the Court awarding
prejudgment interest on the following damages awarded in the Judgment: (1) late fees: (2)
upstairs storage rent; (3) pipeyard storage rent; (4) space #16 rent; and (5) food and drink credit.
The law applicable to an award of prejudgment interest was set out in Ross v. Ross, 145 Idaho
274, 276-277, 178 P.3d 639. 641-642 (App. 2007):
Idaho statutory law. Idaho Code § 28-22-104, calls for the award of
prejudgment interest on certain types of money claims, and case law likewise
calls for prejudgment interest on damages awarded for unjust enrichment. Jones v.
Whiteley, 112 Idaho 886, 889, 736 P.2d 1340. 1343 (Ct. App. 1987). Under either
the statute or the equitable remedy of unjust enrichment, however, prejudgment
interest is allowed only where the damages are liquidated or readily ascertainable
by mathematical process. Id.; Child v. Blaser, 111 Idaho 702, 706, 727 P.2d 893.
897 (Ct. App. 1986). This limitation is based upon "equitable considerations."
Farm Dev. Corp. v. Hernandez, 93 Idaho 918, 920, 478 P.2d 298, 300 (1970),
which presumably include the notion that a person who could not determine the
amount owed should not be charged interest on the sum that is ultimately found to
be due. See 22 AM.JUR.2D Damages § 654 (1988). However, "where the amount
of liability is liquidated or capable of ascertainment by mere mathematical
processes" interest is allowed from a time prior to judgment, "for in that event the
ORDER ON MOTION FOR COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES
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interest in fully compensating the injured party predominates over other equitable
considerations:' Farm Dev. Corp., 93 Idaho at 920, 478 P.2d at 300 (quoting
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Clover Creek Cattle Co., 92 Idaho 889,
900, 452 P.2d 993, 1004 (1969)). See also Doolittle v. Meridian Joint Sch Dist.
No. 2. 128 [daho 805,814,919 P.2d 334,343 (1996); Davis v. Prof'! Bus. Serv ..
Inc., 109 Idaho 810,817,712 P.2d 511. 518 (1985); Child, 111 Idaho at 706-07,
727 P.2d at 897-98.
The mere fact that a claim is disputed or litigated does not render damages
"unascertainable," for if this were the case, a party could delay payment without
incurring interest expense by disputing and litigating any claim, and prejudgment
interest would never be awarded. Ace Realty, Inc. v. Anderson, 106 Idaho 742.
751,682 P.2d 1289, 1298 (Ct. App. 1984). See also l'vfitchell v. Flandro, 95 Idaho
228, 235, 506 P.2d 455, 462 (1972). Rather, damages are unascertainable where
some factor necessary to calculaLe the amount of damages must be determined by
a trier of fact. Conversely:
A claim is liquidated if the evidence furnishes data which, if believed,
makes it possible to compute the amount with exactness, without reliance
upon opinion or discretion. Examples are claims upon promises to pay a
fixed sum, claims for money had and received, claims for money paid out,
and claims for goods or services to be paid for at an agreed rate.
Seubert Excavators, Inc. v. Eucon Corp., 125 Idaho 744, 750 n. 2, 874 P.2d 555,
561 n. 2 (Ct. App. 1993), qff'd, 125 Idaho 409, 871 P.2d 826 (1994). There need
be no prayer for interest contained in the complaint to justify the award of
prejudgment interest. Farm Dev. Corp., 93 [daho at 920, 478 P.2d at 300; Stueve
v. Northern Lights, Inc., 122 Idaho 720,723,838 P.2d 323,326 (Ct. App. 1992).

Based on the foregoing standard, the Court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to prejudgment
interest on damages awarded for late fees, upstairs storage space, and the food and drink credit.
Such damages were at all relevant times asce1iainable by mathematical process. However, the
Court finds that damages related to the unjust enrichment claims of Space 16 and storage of the
cooler were not mathematically asce1iainable. Those damages included two important variables
namely. the amount of the unjust enrichment and when such damages accrued. These factors
were not determined until the Comi, as the finder of fact, entered its decision.
Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to prejudgment interest as follows: $931.30 in interest
on damages for late fees, $1,241.38 in interest on damages for unpaid rent on the upstairs
ORDER ON MOTION FOR COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES
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storage, and $286.44 interest on damages for unpaid food and drink credit. The total amount of
prejudgment interest as of March 23, 2010 is $2,459.12.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
The Court finds that Plaintiff is the prevailing Party and Plaintiff's motion for costs and
attorney fees is granted. Defendants' motion for costs and fees is denied. Costs are awarded to
Plaintiff in the amount of $1,178.53. Attorney fees are awarded to Plaintiff in the amount of
$22,128.
Plaintiff's motion for prejudgment interest is granted in part and denied in part, consistent
v\·ith this decision. Prejudgment interest shall be awarded to Plaintiff in the amount of $2,459.12.
DATED this

,s)_ /

day of April, 2010.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this ~ / day of April, 2010, I did send a true and correct copy
of the foregoing document upon the parties listed below by mailing, with the correct postage
thereon; by causing the same to be placed in the respective coutihouse mailbox; or by causing
the same to be hand-delivered.

Bryan D. Smith
B .J. Drisco 11
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES
414 Shoup Ave.
P.O. Box 50731
Idaho Falls, ID 83405

Michael J. Whyte
THOMSEN STEPHENS
2635 Channing Way
Idaho Falls, ID 83404

ROKALD LONG,\,,fQRE
Clerk of the District Court
Boru1eville County, Idaho

By

~11J)/

DeputyJerk
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAIIO, IN AND FOR THE COUJ\lTY OF BONNEVILLE
THE WATKINS COMPANY, LLC, an Idaho
limited liability company,
Case No. CV-08-7258
Plaintiff.

AMENDED JUDG !VIENT

V.

MICHAEL STORMS and KATHY
BURGGRAF.
Defendants.

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs motion for costs and attorney fees
and prejudgment interest. and the Court having entered its Order granting said motions,
and good cause appearing therefore:
IT JS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiff have Judgment
against Defendants in the amount of $43,096.25, plus prejudgment interest in the amount
of $2,459.12, for a judgment of $45,555.37, with interest accruing at the statutory rate
from March 23, 2010.
IT JS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiff have Judgment
against Defendants for costs in the amount of $1,178.53 and attorney fees in the amount
of $22,128 for a total of $23,306.53.

AMENDED.JUDGMENT

Based on the foregoing, the total amount of

Judgment against Defendants 1s $68,861.90. with interest accrumg thereon at the
statutory rate.
Dated this

d(

day of April, 2010.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

J.J~

I hereby certify that on this
day of April, 2010, I did send a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document upon the parties listed below by mailing, with the correct
postage thereon; by causing the same to be placed in the respective courthouse mailbox;
or by causing the same to be hand-delivered.

B.J. Driscoll
SMITH DRISCOLL &
ASSOCIATES, PLLC
P.O. Box 50731
Idaho Falls, ID 83405
Michael J. Whyte
THOMSEN STEPHENS
LAW OFFICES. PLLC
2635 Channing \Vay
Idaho Falls. ID 83404
RONALD LONGMORE
Clerk of the District Court
Bonneville County, Idaho

By_~~~---~
Deputy Clerk

AMENDED JUDGMENT
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Michael J. Whyte, Esq., ISB #4645
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, PLLC
2635 Channing Way
Idaho Falls ID 83404
Telephone (208)522-1230
Fax (208)522-1277
Attorney for Defendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
THE WATKINS COMPANY, LLC,
an Idaho limited liability company,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
V.

MICHAEL STORMS and KA THY
BURGGRAF,
Defendants/Appellants.

TO:

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-08-7258

NOTICE OF APPEAL

THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS, THEW ATKINS COMPANY,
LLC AND THE PARTIES ATTORNEYS, BRIAND. SMITH, ESQ AND B.J. DRISCOLL,
ESQ, 414 SHOUP A VENUE, IDAHO FALLS, IDAHO 83405 AND THE CLERK OF THE
ABOVE ENTITLED COURT.

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above named appellants Michael Stonns and Kathy Burggraff, appeal against the

above named defendants/respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Judgment entered in the
apove entitled action on the 23 rd day of March, 2010, Honorable Judge Joel E. Tingey presiding .
. /:I
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2.

That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme 'court, and the judgments

or orders described in Paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant to Idaho
Appellate Rule 1l(a)(l).
3.

Preliminary statement of the issues on appeal:
(a)

Whether the findings of fact of the district court are contrary to the weight of
the evidence;

(b)

Whether the district court correctly concluded that defendants/appellants are
in breach of the lease;

( c)

Whether the Court correctly determined that plaintiff/respondent in entitled
to terminate the lease, evict defendant and regain possession of the property.

(d)

Whether the Court correctly determined the trial was to be heard by the Court
instead of a jury as originally requested in the pleadings by the plaintiff and
defendant.

(e)

Whether the parties had reached a compromise and/or an accord and
satisfaction with respect to amounts claimed owing by appellants

4.

No portion of the record has been sealed.

5.

(a)

Is a repo1ier's transcript requested? Yes

(b)

Appellate requests the reporter's standard transcript as defined in Rule 25( c)
I.A.R.

6.

The appellants request the following documents to be included in the clerk's record

in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R.: None.

2-
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7.

The appellant requests the following documents, charts, or pictures offered or

admitted as exhibits to be copied and sent to the Supreme Court: All exhibits admitted as evidence
during the trial.
8.

I certify that:
(a)

A copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on each reporter of whom
a transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below:
Jack Fuller, 605 N. Capital Ave., Idaho Falls, ID 83402

(b)

That the clerk of the district court or administrative agency has been paid the
estimated fee for preparation of the reporter's transcript.

(c)

That the estimated fees for preparation of the clerk's record have been paid.

(d)

That the appellate filing fee has been paid.

(e)

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant
to Rule 20.

DATED this Jo day of April, 2010.
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES, P.L.L.C.

By:

3-

NOTICE OF APPEAL

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a duly licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, resident of and with
my office in Idaho Falls, Idaho; that on the~ day of April, 2010, I caused a true and correct copy
of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL to be served upon the following persons at the addresses
below their names either by depositing said document in the United States mail with the correct
postage thereon or by hand delivering or by transmitting by facsimile as set forth below.
BRYAND SMITH ESQ
B J DRISCOLL ESQ
PO BOX 50731
IDAHO FALLS ID 83405-0731

[X] Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Facsimile

JACK L. FULLER, CSR
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
BONNEVILLE COUNTY COURTHOUSE
605 N. CAPITAL A VENUE
IDAHO FALLS, ID 83401

[X] Mail
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Facsimile

THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES,

By:

JDH:tlh
J ldata\MJ\V\6753-003\00 I Ntc of Appeal.wpd
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PLLC

BOHNE. L LC COUtiTY
J,

Bryan D. Smith, Esq. -- ISB #44 l 1
B. J. Driscoll, Esq. - ISB # 7010
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC
414 Shoup Ave.
P.O. Box 50731
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405
Telephone: (208) 524-0731
Facsimile: (208) 529-4166
bds(iil,eidaholaw.com
bjd(cz)eidaho law. com

-
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Attorneys for PlaintiffJRespondent/Cross-Appellant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

THE WATKINS COMPANY, LLC,
an ldaho limited liability company,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-08-7258
NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL

V.

MICHAEL STORMS and KATHY
BURGGRAF,
Defendants.

TO:

MICHAEL STORMS, and KATHY BURGGRAF, Defendants/Respondents,
and MICHAEL J. WHYTE, ESQ., of THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW
OFFICES, PLLC, their attorneys of record; and TO THE CLERK OF THE
ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT;

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:

l.

The above-named plaintif±Jrespondent/cross-appellant, The Watkins

Company, LLC ("Watkins"), cross-appeals to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Seventh
Judicial District Court's Judgment entered March 23, 2010 and the Amended Judgment
entered April 21, 20 l 0, in the above-entitled action against defendants/appellants/cross-

NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL - Page 1
F:\CLIENTS\BDS\7973\Pleadings\077 Notice of Cross Appeal.doc
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respondents and in favor of Watkins, the Honorable Joel E. Tingey, District Judge,
presiding.
2.

Watkins has the right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the

judgment described in paragraph one above is subject to appeal pursuant to Idaho
Appellate Rules l l(a) and 15.
3.

A preliminary statement of the issue which Watkins intends to asse11

011

cross-appeal is the following:
a.

Did the district court commit reversible error by refusing to

enforce the remedies provision of the lease where the defendants failed to put 011
any evidence of the future rental amount that Watkins could have reasonably
avoided?
4.

The defendants/appellants/cross-respondents have already requested a

copy of the reporter's standard transcript. Watkins does not request any additional
reporter's transcripts. Watkins requests a copy or the transcript in electronic format.
5.
6.

Watkins does not request any additional documents be included in the

clerk's record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, Idaho Appellate
Rules.
7.

Watkins does not request any additional exhibits, offered or admitted,

other than those automatically included pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 28 and those
designated by the appellants.
8.

1 certify:

NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL - Page 2
F:\CLIENTS\BDS\7973\Pleadings\077 Notice of Cross Appeal.doc
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(a)

That a copy of this notice of cross-appeal has been served on each

reporter of whom a transcript has been requested, if any;
(b)

That the reporter who reported the trial before the district court and

from whom a transcript has been requested has been paid the estimated fee for
preparation of the reporter's transcripts, if any;
(c)

That the estimated fee for including additional documents in the

clerk's record has been paid, if any;
(d)

That the appellate filing fee has been paid; and

(e)

That service has been made upon all paities required to be served

pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 20.
DATED this

__j_ day of May, 2010.
SMITH, DRISCOLL

& ASSOCIATES, PLLC

\
By:

riscoll
At rneys for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this}/_ day of May, 2010, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF CROSS-APPEAL to be served, by placing
the same in a sealed envelope and depositing in the United States Mail, postage prepaid,
or hand delivery, facsimile transmission or overnight delivery, addressed to the
following:
[
[
[
[

Michael J. Whyte, Esq.
THOMSEN STEPHENS LAW OFFICES,

PLLC
263 5 Channing Way
Idaho Falls, ID 83404
Ronald Longmore
Clerk ofthe District Court
605 N. Capital Avenue
Idaho Falls, Idaho, 83402

~ · S . Mail
] Fax
] Overnight Delivery
] Hand Delivery

[~U.S. Mail

[ ] rax
[ ] Overnight Delivery
[ ] Hand Delivery
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

THE WATKINS COMPANY, LLC,
An Idaho limited liability company,

Plaintiff/Respondent,-Cross
Appellant,
vs.
MICHAEL STORMS and KA THY,
BURGGRAF,
Defendant/Appellants-Cross
Respondents,

________________
Appeal from:

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE
OF APPEAL
Case No. CV-2008-725 8
Docket No.

31/;, g3

Seventh Judicial District, Bonneville County

Honorable Joel E. Tingey, District Judge, presiding.
Case number from Court:

CV-2008- 7258

Order or Judgment appealed from: Judgment, entered March 23,2010 and the amended Judgment
entered, April 21, 201 0.
Attorney for Appellant/Respondent:

Michael Whyte

Attorney for Respondent/Appellants:

BJ. Driscoll

Appealed by:

Mike Stonns and Kathy Burggraf

Appealed against:

The Watkins Company

Cross Appeal by:

The Watkins Company

Cross Appeal against:

Michael Stmms and Kathy Burggraph

Notice of Appeal Filed:

April 30, 2010

Notice of Cross Appeal Filed:

May 4, 2010

Appellate Fee Paid:

no

Was District Court Rep01ier's Transcript requested?

Yes

If so, name of reporter:

Jack Fuller

Dated: May 10, 2010

FILED - ORIGINAL
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL - 1
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MAY I 3 2010

RONALD LONGMORE
Clerk of the District Court

By:

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL- 2

THE \VATKlNS COMPAt,1r, LLC, an Idaho
limited liability company,

)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross Appellant,

)

ORDER COKDITIONALL Y
DISMISSING APPEAL

)
)
V.

)

MICHAEL STORMS, KATHY BURGGRAF,

)
)

Supreme Comi Docket No. 37685-2010
Bo1meYille County Docket No.
2008- 7258

)

Defendants-Appellants-Cross
Respondents.

)
)

The Appellant having failed to pay the necessary fees for preparation of the Clerk's
Record and Repo1ier's Transcript on appeal as required by Appellate Rule 27(c); therefore, good
cause appeanng;
lT HEREBY IS ORDERED that this appeal be, and hereby is, CONDlTIONi\LLY
DISMISSED unless the required fees for preparation of the Clerk's Record and Reporter's
Transcript are paid to the District Com1 Clerk within twenty-one (21) days from the date of this
Order.

IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that this appeal is SUSPENTIED until further notice.
DATED this

J':?r:

day of May 2010.
For the Supreme Cami
iI

cc:

Counsel of Record
District Com1 Clerk
District Cami Repmier
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE
THE WATKINS COMPANY, LLC,
An Idaho limited liability company,

)
)
)
)
Plaintiff/Respondent,-Cross
)
Appellant,
)
)
vs.
)
)
MICHAEL STORMS and KATHY,
)
BURGGRAF,
)
)
Defendant/Appellants-Cross
)
Respondents,
)
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _)

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Bonneville

CLERK'S CERTIFICATION
OF EXHIBITS
Case No. CV-2008-7258
Docket No.

)
)
)

I, Ronald Longmore, Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State of
Idaho, in and for the County of Bonneville, do hereby certify that the foregoing Exhibits were marked for
identification and offered in evidence, admitted, and used and considered by the Court in its
determination: Please see attached pages.
Plaintiffs Exhibit List Index, dated 2-9-10
And I further certify that all of said Exhibits are on file in my office and are part of this record on
Appeal in this cause, and are hereby transmitted to the Supreme Court.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the District Court
this 1ih day of June, 2010.
RONALD LONGMORE

CLERK'S CERTIFICATION OF EXHIBITS - 1

PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT LIST INDEX
Watkins v. Storms, et al.
Bonneville County Case No. CV-08-77258
Trial Date: 02/09/2010
Exhibit
No.
1.

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.
13.
14.

1.5.

16.

Description
Commercial Lease and Deposit
Receipt dated 7/31/1996 with
Addendum A, Addendum B, Exhibit
C, and Addendum D
The Watkins Company, LLC
documents
Documents re: Brownstone monthly
gross sales and sales tax payments
"Brownstone Monthly Rent Deposit"
forms
Intentionally omitted
Intentionally omitted
Invoice 2005-105 dated 1/21/2005
from Briggs Roofing to Walkins
Enterprises for $2,680.00
Ck #3934 dated 3/15/2005 from
Brownstone Companies, Inc. to
Watkins Enterprises for $1,780.00
Ck #2051 stub dated 5/18/2005 from
The Watkins Company to Briggs
Roofing for $2,330.00
Ck #4146 dated 12/23/2005 from
Brownstone Companies, Inc. to
Watkins Enterprise for $5,000.00
Invoice #2006-226 dated 5/2/2006
from Briggs Roofing to V-./ atkins
Enterprises for $12,135.00
Intentionally omitted
Invoice 120 from Briggs Roofing
Company to Watkins Enterprise
Ck #1225 dated 6/21/2007 from
Brownstone Companies, Inc. to Dane
Watkins for $500.00
Ck #4187 dated 6/22/2007 from The
Watkins Company, LLC to Briggs
Roofing Company for $5,500.00
Ck #4621 dated 12/4/2007 from The
Watkins Company, LLC to Waters
Construction for $4,000.00
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Comment

i

18.
]9.
20.
21.

I
I 23.

26.

28.

30.
31.
32
34.
35
36.
38.
39.

40.

41.

• Intentionally omitted
Three Day Notice to Pay Rent or
Quit the Premises dated 7/10/2008
Three Day Notice to Pay Rent or
Quit the Premises dated 9/12/2008
· "Brownstone Rent Deducted Due''
Ck #1542 dated 7/J 1/2008 from
Brownstone Companies, Inc. to
Watkins & Watkins for $17,900.00
Ck # 1583 dated 9/14/2008 from
Brownstone Companies, Inc. to
Watkins Enterprises for $6,219.00
Intentionally omitted
1/8/2007 letter from Dane Watkins to
Marvin Smith
5/5/2008 letter from Dane Watkins to
Mike Storms
6/12/2008 letters from Bryan D.
Smith to Brad Williams and Kathy
Burggraf
9/23/2008 letter from Michael J.
Whyte to Bryan D. Smith
4/30/2009 letter from B. J. Driscoll
to Michael J. Whyte
4/13/2009 letter from B. J. Driscoll
to Michael J. Whyte
Photos of upstairs storage area
Photos of Space #16
Photos of sidewalk area
Photos of "pipeyard" storage area
Rent, Late Fees, And Interest
Summary
Unjust Enrichment Summary
Intentionally mnitted
Total Damage Summary
Expired gifts certificates from
Brownstone
Defendants· Answers to Plaintiffs
First Set of Interrogatories dated
7/7/2009
Defendants' Responses to Plaintiffs
First Set of Requests for Production
dated 7/7/2009
Defendants' Supplemental
Responses to Plaintiff's First Set of
Requests for Production dated
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42.

43.
I
I

44.
45.
46.

47.
'
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H
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II
I

I

F:\CLIENTS\E DS\7973\Trial\Exhibits\P.s Exhibi1 Index.doc

A

;

8/11/2009
Defendants' Supplemental Answers
to Plaintiffs First Set of
Interrogatories dated 10/27/2009
Defendants' Second Supplemental
Responses to Plaintiff's First set of
Interrogatories and Requests for
Production dated 11/12/2009
Affidavit of Michael Storms dated
12/10/2009
Affidavit of Michael Storms dated
7/28/2009
Affidavit of Michael Storms in
Support of his Objection to
Plaintiff's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment dated
12/23/2009
Affidavit of Kathy Burggraf dated
7/29/2009
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE

THE WATKINS COMPANY, LLC,
An Idaho limited liability company,

Plaintiff/Respondent,-Cross
Appellant,
vs.
MICHAEL STORMS and KA THY,
BURGGRAF,
Defendant/Appellants-Cross
Respondents,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE
OF SERVICE
Case No. CV-2008-7258
Docket No. 37685

_________________
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

17 /~ay of June, 2010, I served a copy of the Reporter's

Transcript (if requested) and the Clerk's Record in the Appeal to the Supreme Court in the above entitled
cause upon the following attorneys:
Dean C. Brandstetter, Esq.
COX, OHMAN & BRANDSTETTER
P.O. Box 51600
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-1600

B. J. Driscoll, Esq.
McGRATH, MEACHAM & SMITH PLLC
P.O. Box 50731
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0731

Attorney for Appellant

Attorney for Respondent

by depositing a copy of each thereof in the United States mail, postage prepaid, in an envelope addressed
to said attorneys at the foregoing address, which is the last address of said attorneys known to me.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE - I
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